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The United States Women’s National Soccer Team has dominated 
the sport since the inaugural Women’s World Cup in 1991. Despite its 
success on the field, however, the team has had a contentious 
relationship over the last three decades with the United States Soccer 
Federation, the sport’s governing body in the United States. The 
ongoing discord between the Women’s National Team and the U.S. 
Soccer Federation culminated in March 2019, when twenty-eight 
players from the team filed a lawsuit alleging that the Federation had 
violated the Equal Pay Act by paying them less than it paid members 
of the Men’s National Team.  
This Article traces the history of strife between the Women’s 
National Team and the U.S. Soccer Federation. The troubled 
relationship is a result of the mismatch between the team’s superior 
results but lower pay compared to the Men’s National Team. This 
mismatch has its roots in competing legal and societal forces. On the 
one hand, Title IX caused an explosion in the participation rate for 
women’s soccer in the United States, which has led to the Women’s 
National Team’s unprecedented success. On the other hand, with the 
exception of the World Cup finals every four years, the viewership 
market for women’s soccer remains much smaller than the market for 
men’s soccer, which has resulted in lower revenue generation by the 
Women’s National Team compared to the far less successful Men’s 
National Team.  
After explaining the history and cause of the turmoil between the 
Women’s National Team and the U.S. Soccer Federation, this Article 
analyzes the merits of the players’ Equal Pay Act claim. The Article 
contends that the Federation has the stronger position on the merits of 
the claim, but further argues that the Federation should renegotiate the 
Women’s National Team’s collective bargaining agreement in light of 
the Federation’s mission of “gender equality.” The Article proposes 
specific principles that might guide that renegotiation and lead to a 
successful resolution of the long-standing tensions between the 
Women’s National Team and the U.S. Soccer Federation.  
INTRODUCTION 
hants of “Equal Pay!” rang through France’s Stade de Lyon 
immediately following the victory by the United States 
Women’s National Soccer Team over the Netherlands in the finals 
of the 2019 Women’s World Cup. Those same chants erupted at 
the ticker-tape victory parade in New York City celebrating the team 
C 
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after its return from France. And who could argue against the idea that 
the U.S. women deserve to be treated equally, particularly given their 
success on the field?  
The Women’s National Team (WNT) is the most dominant national 
soccer team in the sport’s history. With its victory in the 2019 Women’s 
World Cup, the WNT has won four of the eight World Cup tournaments 
held for women.1 That is the highest percentage of World Cup victories 
for any national soccer team, men or women.2 In contrast, the United 
States Men’s National Team (MNT) has failed to progress beyond the 
quarterfinal round of the quadrennial Men’s World Cup since the 
inaugural men’s tournament in 1930. The MNT did not even qualify 
for the most recent Men’s World Cup in 2018.3  
Yet despite its victories on the field and its success compared to the 
men’s team, the WNT has struggled to achieve what its players 
consider equal pay and equal treatment from the United States Soccer 
Federation (“Federation” or “USSF”), the governing body for the sport 
of soccer in the United States. Over the last several decades, WNT 
players have alleged that the Federation has favored the MNT with 
more generous financial arrangements and better treatment. The long-
term frustrations of WNT players were expressed in a letter by their 
1 Morgan Turner, Past Women’s World Cup Champions, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 7, 
2019), https://www.si.com/2019/06/07/womens-world-cup-winners-list-past-champions-
finals [https://perma.cc/27JD-UX82]. At the time of the WNT’s first victory, in 1991, the 
tournament was called the “FIFA World Championship for Women’s Football for the 
M&M’s Cup.” See CAITLIN MURRAY, THE NATIONAL TEAM: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
WOMEN WHO CHANGED SOCCER 25 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). Despite the 
different name, that tournament was the preeminent international tournament for women’s 
national teams and was what is today called the “Women’s World Cup.” The comparable 
tournament for men is technically called the “FIFA World Cup.” Throughout this Article, 
the terms “Women’s World Cup” and “Men’s World Cup” are used to refer to these 
tournaments and distinguish between the women’s and men’s competitions. Both 
tournaments are held every four years, with the most recent Men’s World Cup in 2018 and 
the most recent Women’s World Cup in 2019. 
2 The most successful men’s team, Brazil, has won five of twenty-two Men’s World Cup 
tournaments. Tim Hackett, List of World Cup Winners, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 11, 
2018), https://www.si.com/soccer/2018/world-cup-winners-list-past-history-champions-final 
[https://perma.cc/E9GE-N3FT]. 
3 The best showing by the MNT in the Men’s World Cup was in 1930 when it secured 
third place. Since then, the best result for the MNT has been a quarterfinal loss in the 2002 
World Cup. The MNT failed to qualify for the 2018 World Cup when it lost 2–1 to Trinidad 
and Tobago on October 10, 2017. Andrew Das, United States Misses World Cup for First 
Time Since 1986, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/sports/ 
soccer/usmnt-trinidad-world-cup.html [https://perma.cc/N9ZV-3AS2]. 
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attorney to the United States Olympic Committee in November 2004.4 
The letter cataloged some of the players’ complaints of mistreatment, 
including:  
• discriminatory statements by Federation representatives that
the Federation would not have a women’s national team if it
were not required;
• unequal pay compared to the men’s team;
• unequal support with respect to matters such as equipment
managers, trainers, massage therapists, meals, hotel
accommodations, and transportation;
• unwillingness of the Federation to provide financial backing
to the then-existing women’s professional league, despite
granting substantial financial support to the men’s
professional league; and
• lack of marketing support for the women’s team.5
Since the time of that letter, the Federation has addressed some of 
these issues. For example, over the last several years the Federation has 
publicly celebrated the success of the women’s team and recognized 
the positive impact the team has had on the sport of soccer.6 Moreover, 
since 2013 the Federation has made significant and ongoing financial 
investments in the domestic professional women’s league, the National 
Women’s Soccer League.7  
4 See Olympic Family—Functional or Dysfunctional?: Hearing on H.R. 521-26 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 49–56 (2005) (letter from John B. Langel, Attorney, Ballard Spahr 
Andrews & Ingersoll LLP, to Jim Scheer, Acting Chief Exec. Officer & Chief of Sports 
Performance, U.S. Olympic Comm. (Nov. 15, 2004)). 
5 Id. In addition to these comments about the WNT specifically, Sepp Blatter, the former 
head of FIFA (the governing body of international soccer), made discriminatory and 
derogatory public comments in 2004 when he stated that women’s soccer would attract 
more attention from prospective viewers if the players wore tighter shorts. See Marcus 
Christenson & Paul Kelso, Soccer Chief’s Plan to Boost Women’s Game? Hotpants, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2004, 9:42 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/jan/16/ 
football.gender [https://perma.cc/G3QN-3VH8]. 
6 See Planet Fútbol (@si_soccer), TWITTER (Mar. 31, 2016, 10:42 AM), https://twitter. 
com/si_soccer/status/715595145907933185 [https://perma.cc/AWB6-8ETW] (stating “Our 
[the Federation’s] efforts to be advocates for women’s soccer are unwavering. For 30 years, 
we have been a world leader in promoting the women’s game and are proud of the long-
standing commitment we have made to building women’s soccer in the United States and 
furthering opportunities in soccer for young women and girls around the world. This 
includes leading the successful campaign to introduce women’s soccer in the Olympics in 
1996, the inclusion of prize money for the Women’s World Cup, and the establishment and 
support of the National Women’s Soccer League, which is now in its fourth year of play.”). 
7 In an open letter released July 29, 2019, Federation President Carlos Cordeiro claimed 
that the Federation has invested “approximately $18 million” in the National Women’s 
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Despite these positive developments, however, some of the issues 
identified in 2004 persist, and other new concerns have arisen. 
Specifically, the WNT players still assert that they are underpaid in 
comparison to the MNT players. In addition, the current WNT players 
point out that the Federation requires them to play their games on 
artificial turf more frequently than the MNT,8 which presents a greater 
risk of injury and diminishes the quality of the game. WNT players also 
note that they do not receive the same travel benefits as the MNT, 
exemplified by the fact that MNT traveled by chartered flights 
seventeen times in 2017, while that same year the WNT did not travel 
even once by chartered flight.9 These new grievances and the consistent 
claim of unequal pay led twenty-eight current WNT players to file a 
lawsuit in March 2019 alleging that the Federation has engaged in 
gender discrimination and violated the Equal Pay Act.  
The WNT players’ lawsuit has attracted extensive media attention 
and even resulted in proposed federal legislation.10 Part I of this Article 
explains the background of the dispute between the WNT players and 
the Federation. Part II examines a potential reason for the long-term 
tension between the parties. Part III describes the major differences 
between the WNT’s collective bargaining agreement and the MNT’s 
collective bargaining agreement. Part IV assesses the strengths of the 
WNT players’ claim of unequal pay against the Federation. Finally, 
Part V discusses possible ways to address the concerns raised by the 
WNT players.  
Soccer League “over the years.” Letter from Carlos Cordeiro, President, U.S. Soccer, to U.S. 
Soccer Membership (July 29, 2019) [hereinafter Cordeiro Letter to Membership], https:// 
www.ussoccer.com/governance/board-of-directors/us-soccer-president-carlos-cordeiro/ 
open-letter-july-29-2019-finding-common-ground [https://perma.cc/2S4W-WYLH]. The 
Federation pays the salaries for most of the WNT players who play in the league. In fiscal 
years 2017 and 2018, for example, the Federation spent $2.4 million and $1.7 million on the 
NWSL, respectively. See U.S. SOCCER FED’N, 2018 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING BOOK OF 
REPORTS § IV (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.flipsnack.com/ussoccer/2018-u-s-soccer-agm-
book-of-reports.html [https://perma.cc/VS7Z-24QK] [hereinafter U.S. SOCCER FED’N] 
(proposing a budget for fiscal year 2019).  
8 Plaintiffs’ Collective Action Complaint for Violations of the Equal Pay Act and Class 
Action Complaint for Violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ¶ 70, 
Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-01717 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) [hereinafter 
Plaintiffs’ Collective Action Complaint]. 
9 Id. ¶ 73, at 13. 
10 Shanna McCarriston, Legislation Supporting USWNT’s Fight for Equal Pay 
Introduced in Congress, CBS SPORTS (July 23, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.cbssports. 
com/soccer/news/legislation-supporting-uswnts-fight-for-equal-pay-introduced-in-congress/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZG4C-LZKM]. 
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I 
BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT DISPUTE 
The current dispute between the WNT players and the Federation 
involves allegations of unequal pay and disparate treatment compared 
to the MNT, particularly related to playing surfaces and travel 
accommodations. Those inequalities are reflected in the two teams’ 
separate collective bargaining agreements. Before examining those 
agreements in detail, however, it is helpful to understand that the 
specific allegations at the root of the WNT players’ current lawsuit 
come in the context of a long and contentious relationship between the 
Federation and generations of WNT players.  
The origin for claims of mistreatment began as early as the mid-
1980s when the Federation first fielded a women’s national team.11 At 
that time, international soccer competitions for women were just 
starting, there was no women’s professional league, and players were 
treated by the Federation as the amateurs they were. The first WNT to 
compete internationally was cobbled together in 1985, practicing for 
less than a week before playing in a competition called the 
“Mundialito.”12 Given their minimal preparation for the tournament, it 
was not surprising that the team finished last among the four national 
teams participating.13 The cavalier approach taken by the Federation 
toward both the WNT and the tournament was exemplified by the 
uniforms that the women wore: oversized hand-me-downs with USA 
decals ironed on them.14  
Six years later at the first Women’s World Cup, the team was much 
more organized, with legendary UNC coach Anson Dorrance leading 
the team. Even so, in 1991 the women’s international game was still in 
its earliest developmental stages, particularly compared to the men’s 
game, which had been holding World Cup tournaments since 1930. The 
1991 Women’s World Cup, hosted by China, was not even televised in 
the United States. The difference in the men’s and women’s games was 
further demonstrated by the comparative treatment of the MNT and the 
WNT at the time by the Federation. When the MNT qualified for the 
1990 Men’s World Cup, each player on the MNT received a $10,000 
11 See MURRAY, supra note 1, at 3–12 (summarizing the establishment of the first WNT 
and the experiences of the players on that team). 
12 See id. at 4–5. 
13 See 32 Years of USWNT Glory, FIFA (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.fifa.com/womens-
football/news/32-years-of-uswnt-glory-2904417 [https://perma.cc/3XRR-F4QM] [herein-
after 32 Years of USWNT Glory]. See also MURRAY, supra note 1, at 4–5.  
14 See MURRAY, supra note 1, at 4–5. 
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bonus from the Federation. The MNT then proceeded to lose all three 
games they played in the tournament and were eliminated in the first 
round. In contrast, when the WNT qualified for the 1991 Women’s 
World Cup, they did not receive a bonus payment. Instead, each player 
on the team received two T-shirts from the Federation.15 When the 
WNT went on to outscore their opponents 25–5 and win the inaugural 
Women’s World Cup tournament, the players each received only a 
$500 bonus payment from the Federation.16  
Tensions between the players and the Federation increased in the 
mid-1990s when nine WNT players threatened to sit out the 1996 
Olympic Games if they did not receive medal bonuses on the same 
terms as the men’s Olympic soccer team.17 Initially, the Federation 
proposed that the WNT players would receive a bonus only if the team 
won the gold medal, while the men would receive a bonus for winning 
gold, silver, or bronze. In response to the threat by the nine players to 
sit out the tournament, the Federation locked those players out of a pre-
Olympics training camp.18  
The dispute was eventually resolved when the Federation agreed to 
pay the WNT players a bonus for winning either gold or silver. At the 
15 Id. at 18. 
16 See id. at 7–12. Just the year before, FIFA had awarded approximately $500,000 in 
prize money to the winner of the 1990 Men’s World Cup. See FIFA, COMMC’NS & PUB. 
AFFAIRS DIV., OFF THE PITCH, STATISTICAL KIT 6, https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/ 
fifafacts/mencompwc/51/97/64/fwc_kit-6_offthepitch.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y55S-KZUT] 
(giving prize money statistics for the Men’s World Cup dating back to 1982). In the 1990 
Men’s World Cup, the football association for the winning men’s team (Argentina) received 
667,127 Swiss francs, which equated under the then current exchange rate to approximately 
$484,000. U.S. Dollar to Swiss Franc Spot Exchange Rates for 1990 from the Bank 
of England, POUNDSTERLING LIVE, https://www.poundsterlinglive.com/bank-of-england-
spot/historical-spot-exchange-rates/usd/USD-to-CHF-1990 [https://perma.cc/7H4L-X4CM] 
(last visited Feb. 9, 2020). FIFA did not award prize money in the Women’s World Cup 
until the fifth tournament in 2007. Nick Harris, Number-Crunched: The Rise and Rise 
of the Women’s World Cup, SPORTING INTELLIGENCE (June 1, 2015), http://www. 
sportingintelligence.com/2015/06/01/number-crunched-the-rise-and-rise-of-the-womens-
world-cup-010601/ [https://perma.cc/LPD3-LXYN].  
17 Under Olympic rules, the senior women’s national team is permitted to participate 
in Olympic competition. On the men’s side, teams are permitted to field only three players 
older than twenty-three years old, with the rest of the team composed of players under 
twenty-three. Consequently, the full senior MNT does not participate in Olympic 
competitions. See International Association Football Federation, OLYMPIC.ORG, 
https://www.olympic.org/international-association-football-federation [https://perma.cc/ 
2SLR-ZTS5] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
18 See Grahame L. Jones, Women Soccer Players Boycott Olympic Camp: Atlanta 
Games: Dispute Involving Top U.S. Players Hinges on Rejection of Contract Offers, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6, 1995, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-12-
06-sp-10918-story.html [https://perma.cc/B34L-HKEJ].
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same time, the men’s team competed under a separate arrangement and 
were still entitled to receive a bonus for winning any medal—gold, 
silver, or bronze. Ultimately, the WNT went on to win the gold medal 
at the 1996 Olympics, the first Olympic Games with women’s soccer 
as a medal sport. The men’s team failed to finish in the top three.19 
Consequently, the WNT players received a $20,000 bonus for their 
performance, while the men’s team received no bonus.20 Although the 
WNT players did not achieve their goal of equal treatment to the men’s 
team, they successfully used the threat of sitting out the competition to 
improve their position with the Federation.  
The next, and perhaps most important, step in the development of 
women’s soccer in the United States came in 1999 when the country 
hosted the Women’s World Cup. The marketing budget for the 
tournament was approximately 10% of the amount spent to market the 
1994 Men’s World Cup, also held in the United States.21 At the time, 
most WNT players maintained second jobs because no women’s 
professional league existed, and their national team wages were 
insufficient to allow them to devote all their time to playing soccer.22 
Despite the part-time status of WNT players and the Federation’s 
substantially lower investment in the Women’s World Cup compared 
to the Men’s World Cup five years earlier, the American public rallied 
behind the team, and excitement built as the team ran through its 
opponents. By the time the WNT reached the finals of the tournament, 
it had captured the nation’s attention. The WNT played the final game 
against China before a sold-out Rose Bowl crowd of 90,000 spectators 
and won in a dramatic shoot-out victory.23  
As a result of their first-place finish, WNT players received bonuses 
of around $50,000 each, with $12,500 of this bonus coming from 
the Federation. The rest came from the tournament’s organizing 
committee, which made an unexpected profit due to the significant 
public interest that developed around the team and the resulting ticket 
sales.24 The bonus for winning the tournament represented a substantial 
increase over the $500 bonuses received by members of the 1991 WNT 
after winning the inaugural Women’s World Cup eight years earlier, 
19 THE INT’L OLYMPIC COMM., Atlanta 1996: Football, OLYMPIC GAMES, https://www. 
olympic.org/atlanta-1996/football [https://perma.cc/AS4R-JQ9V]. 
20 MURRAY, supra note 1, at 23.  
21 Id. at 27.  
22 Id. at 31.  
23 32 Years of USWNT Glory, supra note 13. 
24 MURRAY, supra note 1, at 53.  
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but it still paled in comparison to financial benefits available to the 
men’s team. In 1998, MNT players received $25,000 each for simply 
qualifying for the Men’s World Cup. If the men had won the 
tournament, they each would have received $388,000.25 The MNT did 
not win the 1998 Men’s World Cup, however, scoring only a single 
goal while losing all three of its first-round games and finishing last in 
the tournament.26  
After the 1999 Women’s World Cup, the WNT engaged in lengthy 
and difficult collective bargaining agreement negotiations with the 
Federation. During the course of these negotiations, the WNT players 
again threatened not to play in the upcoming 2000 Olympic Games if 
an agreement could not be reached. But a deal eventually was reached, 
and for the first time the Federation provided WNT players with 
guaranteed compensation. This meant that team members would no 
longer experience the same degree of financial pressure, which had 
required many players to hold second jobs on top of playing soccer at 
the highest level of international competition.27  
In the years following the 1999 Women’s World Cup, and in the 
wake of the huge upsurge in public support for the WNT, two 
professional women’s leagues started and failed. The Women’s United 
Soccer Association (WUSA) was founded in 2000 and folded after its 
third season in 2003.28 Women’s Professional Soccer (WPS) also 
lasted just three seasons, starting in 2009 and ceasing operations in 
2012.29 Unlike the men’s domestic professional league, known as 
Major League Soccer (MLS), neither of these first two women’s 
professional leagues received substantial financial assistance from the 
25 Id. 
26 1998 FIFA World Cup France, Matches, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/ 
archive/france1998/matches/index.html [https://perma.cc/VGX2-HB4A] (last visited Feb. 
7, 2020). Popular soccer commentator Roger Bennett created a podcast series entitled 
“American Fiasco” detailing the debacle of the MNT in the 1998 Men’s World Cup. 
American Fiasco, NAT’L PUB. RADIO, https://www.npr.org/podcasts/614158307/american-
fiasco [https://perma.cc/PTB8-EJ2T].  
27 MURRAY, supra note 1, at 66.  
28 Gretchen Miller, Jonathan Scheyer & Emily Sherrard, Women’s United Soccer 
Association, SOCCER POLITICS, https://sites.duke.edu/wcwp/research-projects/womens-
soccer-in-the-u-s/womens-soccer-after-1999/womens-united-soccer-assocation/ 
[https://perma.cc/M2KS-W966] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
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Federation.30 The Federation’s refusal to provide financial assistance 
to the WUSA or the WPS while granting millions of dollars of aid to 
the MLS fueled complaints of unequal treatment from some of the top 
WNT players.31  
Despite its reluctance to back the first two attempts at women’s 
professional leagues, in 2013 the USSF decided to put its financial 
support behind a third women’s professional league, the National 
Women’s Soccer League (NWSL). In a recent statement, USSF 
President Carlos Cordeiro said that the Federation has invested more 
than $18 million in the NWSL over the last seven years, including 
paying the NWSL salaries for most of the WNT members playing in 
the league.32  
Yet even with the Federation’s increased investment in women’s 
professional soccer, tension between the WNT players and the 
Federation has continued. In 2016, the Federation filed a lawsuit 
against the WNT Players Association seeking a declaration that WNT 
players were not permitted under the terms of their then-existing 
collective bargaining agreement to strike prior to the 2016 Olympic 
Games.33 The Executive Director of the Players Association had 
suggested to Federation representatives that the players would consider 
a strike unless a more favorable collective bargaining agreement could 
be reached following the WNT’s victory in the 2015 Women’s World 
Cup. The Illinois federal district court hearing the matter granted 
summary judgment for the Federation, finding that the WNT Players 
Association was subject to the collective bargaining agreement’s “no 
strike” clause until December 31, 2016, after the 2016 Olympic Games. 
Also in 2016, five WNT players filed a complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) claiming wage 
discrimination against the Federation.34 According to the complaint, 
30 See MURRAY, supra note 1, at 80–84. 
31 See id. at 83 (quoting WNT player Julie Foudy as stating, “[The USSF] had given $10 
million for MLS and we couldn’t even get them to support a women’s league.”). 
32 Andrew Das, U.S. Soccer Says It Pays Women’s Team More Than Men’s Team, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/29/sports/soccer/us-soccer-
equal-pay.html [https://perma.cc/L2D5-VBT5]. 
33 See U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc. v. U.S. Women’s Nat’l Soccer Team Players Ass’n, 190 
F. Supp. 3d 777 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
34 See Andrew Das, Top Female Players Accuse U.S. Soccer of Wage Discrimination,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/01/sports/soccer/uswnt-us-
women-carli-lloyd-alex-morgan-hope-solo-complain.html [https://perma.cc/36ZY-LB4Z] 
[hereinafter Top Female Players]; Juliet Spies-Gans, USWNT Files Lawsuit Against U.S. 
Soccer in Fight for Equal Pay, HUFFPOST (last updated Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.huffpost. 
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“The Federation pays top tier WNT players between 38% and 72% of 
the compensation the MNT players earn on a per game basis.”35 Hope 
Solo, who at the time was the WNT’s goalkeeper and was one of the 
five players who signed the complaint with the EEOC, told the New 
York Times that the men’s team players “get paid more just to show up 
than we get paid to win major championships.”36 In August 2018, Solo 
filed a complaint against the Federation in the Federal District Court 
for the Northern District of California alleging Equal Pay Act and Title 
VII violations.37 A little more than six months later, the twenty-eight 
members of the current WNT player pool followed Solo’s lead, filing 
a separate lawsuit with the same claims against the Federation in the 
Federal District Court for the Central District of California.  
II 
AN EXPLANATION FOR THE LONG-STANDING TENSIONS 
The brief history set forth above explains the context for the current 
lawsuit by WNT players against the Federation, but it does not explain 
the underlying cause for the persistently contentious relationship 
between the Federation and the players. One answer may be the 
disconnect between the extraordinary success of the team, particularly 
compared to the MNT, and the smaller audience for women’s soccer 
compared to men’s soccer. As for its success, the WNT has benefited, 
at least in the past, from a competitive advantage against its on-field 
opponents because of Title IX, the landmark 1972 federal legislation 
that caused a huge increase in female sports participation in the United 
States.38 At the same time, the WNT has suffered from the structural 
disadvantage of the discriminatory viewing habits of the sports-
spectating public. These discriminatory habits have resulted in a 
smaller market for the “product” of women’s soccer as compared to 
men’s soccer. The consequence of this smaller market has been lower 
revenue generation and, ultimately, less favorable economic terms in 
the WNT’s collective bargaining agreement with the Federation 
compared to the MNT’s collective bargaining agreement. It is perhaps 
com/entry/uswnt-wage-discriminatory-suit-us-soccer_n_56fd33c3e4b0a06d5804ecac 
[https://perma.cc/TCU5-WPWE] (including a copy of complaint attached to the article). 
35 See Spies-Gans, supra note 34. 
36 Top Female Players, supra note 34. 
37 See Complaint for Violation of the Equal Pay Act & Discrimination & Demand for 
Jury Trial, Solo v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, No. 3:18-cv-05215 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018). 
38 ANDREI MARKOVITS, WOMEN IN AMERICAN SOCCER AND EUROPEAN FOOTBALL: 
DIFFERENT ROADS TO SHARED GLORY 98–105 (2019).  
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these competing structural forces—the advantage of Title IX and the 
disadvantage of a smaller market of spectators for women’s soccer than 
men’s soccer—that has played a significant part in the long-standing 
tension between the WNT players and the Federation. 
A. Title IX’s Impact
Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”39 Through the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (CRRA), Congress clarified that 
“Title IX applies directly to school athletic programs so long as any 
part of the school receives federal funding.”40 The result of Title IX 
and the CRRA has been a dramatic increase in female sports 
participation. A report issued on the fortieth anniversary of Title IX by 
the National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education (NCWGE) 
detailed the impact of the law: 
During the 1971–72 school year, immediately before [Title IX] 
passed, fewer than 300,000 girls participated in high school athletics. 
To put that number in perspective, only 7% of all high school athletes 
were girls. In 2010–2011, the number of female athletes had climbed 
by more than tenfold to nearly 3.2 million, or 41% of all high school 
athletes.  
Title IX has also had a huge impact on women’s participation 
in college athletics. In 1971–1972, fewer than 30,000 women 
participated in college sports. In 2010–2011 that number exceeded 
190,000—about 6 times the pre-Title IX rate. In 1972, women 
received only 2% of schools’ athletic budgets, and athletic 
scholarships for women were nonexistent. In 2009–2010, women 
received 48% of the total athletic scholarship dollars at Division I 
schools . . . .41  
According to the NCWGE report, Title IX caused women’s soccer 
to experience some of the greatest participation gains of any sport. In 
particular, the number of college women’s soccer teams increased from 
318 in 1991 to 959 in 2009.42 Soccer journalist Caitlin Murray 
quantified the effect of Title IX on youth soccer as follows: “In 1974, 
39 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2019). 
40 Elaine Chamberlain et al., Athletics & Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments, 
19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 231, 235 (2018). 
41 NAT’L COAL. FOR WOMEN & GIRLS IN EDUC., TITLE IX & ATHLETICS: PROVEN 
BENEFITS, UNFOUNDED OBJECTIONS 8 (2012). 
42 Id. 
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only about 100,000 girls across the country were registered with the 
U.S. Youth Soccer Association. Today [in 2019], that number is in the 
millions.”43 According to Murray, the women on the first WNTs in the 
1980s “were some of the earliest beneficiaries of Title IX.”44  
The high participation numbers for women’s soccer in the United 
States has created a larger and more talented pool of potential national 
team players in the United States compared to other countries. In 2006, 
FIFA conducted a large-scale survey of its 207 member associations.45 
At that time, the United States had the highest number of registered 
female soccer players of any nation. Among the ten countries with the 
highest number of registered female players, the number of female 
players registered with the Federation (1.67 million) constituted 46% 
of all registered female players (a total of 3.668 million players).46 The 
number of American female youth players (1.563 million) made up 
57% of the female youth players among the top ten countries (2.664 
million total female youth players).47 In fact, the United States had 
almost four times more female youth players in 2006 (1.563 million) 
than the country with the second highest number of female youth 
players (Canada, with 407,000).48  
As a result of these high participation numbers for girls’ and 
women’s soccer in the United States, the WNT was at a later stage of 
development than its competition when the Women’s World Cup 
started in 1991. This was particularly the case given that other countries 
with long histories of success in men’s soccer heavily restricted or 
outright prohibited women’s soccer: England prohibited women from 
playing on their national association’s facilities until 1969, and Brazil 
banned women’s soccer altogether until 1979.49 Thus, when Title IX 
mandated equal athletic opportunities for women in the United States, 
other top soccer countries either banned women from the sport or only 
43 MURRAY, supra note 1, at 7. 
44 Id. 
45 Matthias Kunz, 265 Million Playing Football, FIFA MAG. BIG COUNT 10, 13 (July 
1, 2007), https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/bcoffsurv/emaga_9384_10704.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LNK8-XYZ3]. Each country has its own member association of FIFA. 
The USSF is the member association for the United States.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 15. 
48 Id. 
49 See The History of Women’s Football in England, THE FA, http://www.thefa. 
com/womens-girls-football/history [https://perma.cc/FHH4-TCLA] (last visited Feb. 9, 
2020); Ryan Wallerson, Why Women’s Soccer Was Banned in Brazil – Until 1979, OZY 
(Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.ozy.com/the-huddle/why-womens-soccer-was-banned-in-
brazil-until-1979/72241 [https://perma.cc/L89Y-TARN]. 
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recently permitted women to play. The advantage of Title IX accounts, 
at least in part, for the exceptional success of the WNT.50  
B. The Market for Women’s Soccer
Despite the high participation rates for women’s soccer in the United 
States and the on-field success of the WNT, the spectator market for 
women’s soccer, both internationally and in the United States, is still 
smaller than the spectator market for men’s soccer. University of 
Michigan professor Andrei Markovits explains this phenomenon: 
Just because millions produce [i.e., play] a sport does not mean that 
they also will consume [i.e., watch] it. Just because millions bowl, 
run, swim, fish in no way means that millions will watch these sports 
on television or live at the venues even if performed by professionals. 
There is a major chasm between “doing” and “following” a sport—
and nowhere is this more pronounced than among women.51 
The size of the viewing market matters because it drives revenue, 
which ultimately determines the amount of money available to pay 
players. Internationally, the market for men’s soccer is substantially 
larger than the market for women’s soccer. The difference in scale is 
illustrated by the fact that worldwide 3.572 billion people watched 
the 2018 Men’s World Cup,52 while 764 million watched the 2015 
Women’s World Cup.53 As a consequence of this larger market for 
men’s soccer, FIFA generates significantly greater revenue from the 
men’s games.54 This higher revenue passes down to national 
associations (like the Federation) through various payments, including 
much higher prize money for men’s tournaments than for women’s 
50 See MARKOVITS, supra note 38, at 15 (stating that the “massive advance of women as 
sports producers—i.e. as players— . . . is most definitely a direct consequence of the 
revolutionary impact in the United States of Title IX . . .”).  
51 Id. at 139–40. 
52 Media Release, More Than Half the World Watched Record-Breaking 2018 World 
Cup, FIFA (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/more-than-half-the-
world-watched-record-breaking-2018-world-cup [https://perma.cc/7A45-YAHH]. 
53 Media Release, Record-Breaking FIFA Women’s World Cup Tops 750 Million 
TV Viewers, FIFA (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.fifa.com/womensworldcup/news/record-
breaking-fifa-women-s-world-cup-tops-750-million-tv-viewers-2745963 [https://perma.cc/ 
4VCZ-R8WK] (recognizing that comparable figures are not yet available from FIFA for the 
2019 Women’s World Cup). 
54 The USSF estimates that “the 2014 Men’s World Cup generated 50 to 100 times the 
revenue worldwide as the 2015 Women’s World Cup.” Letter from Kathryn H. Ruemmler, 
Attorney, Latham & Watkins LLP, to Greg Mucha, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
n.1 (May 31, 2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/314584338/US-Soccer-EEOC-Response
[https://perma.cc/48U6-TS5Y] (sending a response by the USSF to EEOC charges brought
by five WNT players).
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tournaments.55 For example, FIFA awarded $400 million in prize 
money to the teams participating in the 2018 Men’s World Cup.56 In 
contrast, FIFA provided $30 million in prize money to the teams 
participating in the 2019 Women’s World Cup.57  
FIFA justifies this disparity in prize money based on the differences 
in revenue from the tournaments. Following the 2018 Men’s World 
Cup, FIFA reported that the tournament generated $5.4 billion in 
revenue and a net profit of $3.533 billion.58 FIFA has not provided 
definitive revenue figures with respect to the 2015 or 2019 Women’s 
World Cups, so a direct comparison of profitability is not possible.59 
Based on other information that FIFA has released, however, it does 
appear that there is a significant difference in revenue between the 
Men’s and Women’s World Cup. The value of television broadcasting 
rights drives FIFA’s revenue from the tournaments. FIFA has reported 
that 95% of its income from television broadcasting rights generated 
during the 2015–18 fiscal cycle came from the 2018 Men’s World 
Cup.60 Television broadcasting rights constituted almost 50% of the 
total revenue earned by FIFA during the period.61  
Within the United States, the markets for men’s and women’s soccer 
are closer in size than on the international level. In 2014, the last year 
that the MNT qualified for the Men’s World Cup, the team averaged 
4,306,933 viewers for its games televised on English-language 
channels.62 In 2015, a Women’s World Cup year, the WNT averaged 
just under 60% of that figure, with 2,522,400 viewers per game.63 
55 Id. 
56 See FIFA, FIFA FINANCIAL REPORT 2018, at 36 (2018), https://resources.fifa.com/ 
image/upload/xzshsoe2ayttyquuxhq0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A5D-XXPW] [hereinafter 
FIFA FINANCIAL REPORT 2018].  
57 Id. at 56. 
58 Id. at 34. 
59 See Rachel Bachman, What Is the Women’s World Cup Worth? Not Even FIFA 
Knows, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:17 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-is-the-
womens-world-cup-worth-not-even-fifa-knows-11569335578 [https://perma.cc/9U69-MWW7]. 
60 See FIFA FINANCIAL REPORT 2018, supra note 56, at 16. 
61 See id. at 141. 
62 Lawrence Dockery, USMNT Viewing Audiences for 2014-17 World Cup Qualifying 
Cycle, WORLD SOCCER TALK (Apr. 21, 2019), http://worldsoccertalk.com/2019/04/21/ 
usmnt-viewing-audiences-2014-17-world-cup-qualifying-cycle/ [https://perma.cc/R88H-
LFM2] [hereinafter Viewing Audiences]. The figures cited in this paragraph do not include 
viewers of Spanish-language channels such as Univision.  
63 Lawrence Dockery, USWNT TV Ratings for 2015-19 Averaged 929K on US English-
Language Television, WORLD SOCCER TALK (July 13, 2019), https://worldsoccertalk.com/ 
2019/07/13/uswnt-tv-ratings-2015-19-averaged-929k-us-english-language-television/ 
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Of course, the MNT did not make the 2018 Men’s World Cup, and so 
its average viewership in 2018 dropped to 431,818; on the other hand, 
the WNT’s average viewership for 2019 is likely again to exceed 
2,000,000.64 Table 1 below shows the average viewership for English-
language television broadcasts of WNT and MNT games over four- 
year periods when both teams made their respective World Cup 
tournaments.65 







2015 2,522,400 2014 4,306,933 
2016 721,450 2015 728,550 
2017 378,125 2016 965,842 
2018 302,421 2017 819,842 
Avg. 981,099 Avg. 1,705,292 
Based on the data above, in a four-year cycle when both teams qualify 
for the World Cup, the English-language television audience for an 
MNT game is on average almost 75% larger than the audience for a 
WNT game.  
The difference is even greater when non-English broadcasters are 
taken into account. According to the Federation’s 2018 budget 
documents, viewership of WNT and MNT games in fiscal year 2017 (a 
non-World Cup year for either team) was as shown in Table 2.66  
[https://perma.cc/9WS2-B2HJ] [hereinafter TV Ratings]. As stated above, these figures do 
not include Spanish language viewers. 
64 Id. The average 2019 viewership as of the end of the 2019 Women’s World Cup was 
2,706,412 per game.  
65 Viewing Audiences, supra note 62 (providing MNT data); TV Ratings, supra note 63 
(providing WNT data).  
66 U.S. SOCCER FED’N, supra note 7. 
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Table 2. Total Viewers for U.S. Soccer–Controlled Matches (Matches 
That U.S. Soccer Could Commercialize) 
Team No. of Events Total Viewers Avg./Game 
WNT 12 5,340,000 440,000 
MNT 8 15,410,000 1,930,000 
The WNT does hold the record for the two most-watched soccer 
games in U.S. history, the 2015 and 2019 Women’s World Cup 
finals.67 On average, however, more spectators watch the men’s team 
than the women’s team, at least when both teams qualify for the World 
Cup tournament. Of course, the MNT failed to qualify for the 2018 
Men’s World Cup, but that failure was anomalous and the first time the 
team did not make the World Cup tournament since 1986. With recent 
changes to the World Cup qualification process, it is even more 
unlikely that the team will fail to qualify for the 2022 Men’s World 
Cup.68 Also, because the United States will cohost the 2026 World Cup 
(with Canada and Mexico), the team should automatically qualify for 
that tournament.69 All this is to say that although the Federation does 
not explicitly allocate broadcast revenue between the WNT and the 
MNT in either its financial statements or its budget documents, the 
MNT typically has a larger average television audience for its games 
than the WNT; consequently, more of the broadcast revenue earned by 
the Federation is attributable to the MNT.70  
67 See Tom Hoffarth, Viewership of Women’s World Cup Final Exceeds 14 Million on 
Fox, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2019, 8:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-
world-cup-tv-ratings-20190708-story.html [https://perma.cc/9T3B-BWY].  
68 See Brian Straus, Concacaf Tweaks Format, Keeps Hex for World Cup Qualifying 
Ahead of 2022 Cycle, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 10, 2019), https://www.si.com/soccer/ 
2019/07/10/concacaf-world-cup-qualifying-changes-fifa-ranking-playoffs-usmnt 
[https://perma.cc/L3AS-8NWY]. 
69 Donald Wine II, FIFA Should Give U.S., Mexico and Canada Automatic Qualification 
to 2026 World Cup, SBNATION: STARS AND STRIPES (June 19, 2018, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.starsandstripesfc.com/2018/6/19/17477786/world-cup-2026-usa-usmnt-
mexico-canada-concacaf-fifa-automatic-qualification [https://perma.cc/F8CC-5JW4]. 
70 The Federation also does not separate revenue generated by each of the national teams 
from its sponsorship and licensing arrangement with Nike or its marketing arrangement with 
Soccer United Marketing. See 2018 Consolidated Financial Statements and Supplemental 
Schedules, U.S. SOCCER FED’N, INC. 15–16 (2018), https://www.ussoccer.com/governance/ 
financial-information [https://perma.cc/Q3L9-39XZ] [hereinafter 2018 Audited Financial 
Statements]. Rather, in its annual budget document, the Federation says that it takes a 
“portfolio approach” with respect to the WNT and MNT. See U.S. SOCCER FED’N, supra 
note 7. 
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As for game revenue, a letter addressed to “Friends, Colleagues, and 
Supporters of U.S. Soccer” issued to the public by Federation President 
Carlos Cordeiro in July 2019 contends that for the period from 2009 to 
2019, the WNT earned “gross revenue of $101.3 million over 238 
games, for an average of $425,446 per game.”71 Over that same period 
of time, Cordeiro claims that the MNT has earned “$185.7 million over 
191 games, for an average of $942,147 per game.”72 Cordeiro goes on 
in the letter to say that over the 2009–19 period, “WNT games have 
generated a net profit (ticket minus event expenses) in only two years 
(2016 and 2017)” and overall the WNT’s games have “generated a net 
loss of $27.5 million.”73 Cordeiro’s letter does not disclose the net 
profits or losses generated by the MNT over that same time period, but 
media reports state that a Federation spokesman said, “men’s games 
from 2009–2019 produced a net loss of $3,130,980.”74  
The difference in market size between men’s and women’s soccer in 
the United States is also demonstrated by the domestic professional 
leagues. As previously described, two women’s professional leagues 
have started and failed since 2001. The current women’s professional 
league, the NWSL, has shown greater resilience and recently 
completed its seventh season.75 Although the league has survived, it 
has hardly thrived. It has been difficult to follow the teams on 
television. For its 2017 and 2018 seasons, the NWSL had a broadcast 
arrangement only with A&E’s Lifetime channel, which did not cover 
any other sports, to televise one game each week.76 That arrangement 
terminated at the outset of the 2019 season; however, following the 
WNT’s success at the Women’s World Cup, the league entered into an 
agreement to air fourteen NWSL matches on ESPN2 and ESPNEWS.77 
As for in-person attendance, average crowd size at NWSL games in 
71 Cordeiro Letter to Membership, supra note 7. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Bachman, supra note 59. 
75 See Kelly Whiteside, Women’s Pro Soccer League to Debut in U.S. Next Year, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2012, 5:57 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/ 
2012/11/21/new-womens-soccer-league-to-debut-next-year/1720343/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8HEC-RDPL]. 
76 Howard Megdal, NWSL Announces End to Partnership with A&E; Here’s What It 
Means, FORBES (Feb. 20, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardmegdal/ 
2019/02/20/nwsl-announces-end-to-partnership-with-ae-leaving-league-without-broadcast-
partner/#6dcac94e5a66 [https://perma.cc/CM5S-Y2X6].  
77 NWSL Media Staff, 14 NWSL Matches to Air on ESPN2 and ESPNEWS, NWSL 
SOCCER (July 4, 2019), http://www.nwslsoccer.com/news/article/14-nwsl-matches-to-air-
on-espn2-and-espnews [https://perma.cc/6SC6-FXB9]. 
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2018 was just over 6,000 spectators.78 In 2019, the maximum salary 
for an NWSL player who does not play for the WNT is $46,200;79 the 
minimum salary is $16,538.80 The salaries of WNT players who play 
in the NWSL are paid by the Federation and in 2019 ranged from 
$67,500 to $72,500.81  
In comparison, the men’s domestic professional league, the MLS, is 
now in its twenty-fourth season.82 Although the league operated at a 
deficit for many of those years, it has a stable and loyal spectator base, 
and multiple expansion teams have recently joined the league for an 
expansion fee of $150 million.83 Games are televised by Fox, ESPN, 
and Univision, which pay an average of $90 million each year for the 
right to carry MLS games. The average attendance at MLS games in 
2018 was almost 22,000 spectators.84 The MLS Players Association 
reports that the average salary for an MLS player in 2019 (excluding 
certain marquee players, known as “Designated Players”) was 
$345,867.85 The minimum salary for an MLS player in 2019 was 
$70,250.86 Many MNT players play outside the MLS, earning much 
higher salaries.87  
78 2019 NWSL Attendance, SOCCER STADIUM DIG., https://soccerstadiumdigest.com/ 
2019-nwsl-attendance/ [https://perma.cc/69QL-2ES2] (last updated Oct. 12, 2019). 
79 Jamie Goldberg, NWSL Increases Roster Size, Player Compensation Caps Ahead of 




81 U.S. Soccer Federation & U.S. Women’s Nat’l Team Player’s Association, Collective 
Bargaining Agreement art. 11(B)(2) (2017–21) [hereinafter Women’s Nat’l Team 
Collective Bargaining Agreement].  
82 MLS History, MLS SOCCER (Jan. 1, 2018, 2:01 PM), https://www.mlssoccer.com/ 
league/history [https://perma.cc/G3B2-CSL4]. 
83 Chris Smith, Major League Soccer’s Most Valuable Teams 2018: Atlanta United 
Debuts on Top, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
chrissmith/2018/11/14/mls-most-valuable-teams-2018/#6f850ed22ee9 [https://perma.cc/ 
3RPJ-N5GT]. 
84 2019 MLS Attendance, SOCCER STADIUM DIGEST, https://soccerstadiumdigest.com/ 
2019-mls-attendance/ [https://perma.cc/W56W-KY24] (last updated Aug. 18, 2019). 
85 Salary Guide, MLS PLAYERS ASS’N, https://mlsplayers.org/resources/salary-guide 
[https://perma.cc/QHV4-TMSX] (last updated Sept. 13, 2019). 
86 Major League Soccer & Major League Soccer Players Union, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement § 10.1 (2015–19) [hereinafter MLS Players Ass’n Collective Bargaining 
Agreement], https://mlsplayers.org/resources/cba [https://perma.cc/6AJT-2VVV]. 
87 In 2019, the English Premier League club Chelsea acquired MNT player Christian 
Pulisic from German club Dortmund for a transfer fee of $73 million. Pulisic was reportedly 
paid $1.1 million per year at Dortmund and is expected to make a significantly higher salary 
at Chelsea. Tom Huddleston Jr., This 20-Year-Old Is Worth $73 Million and Could Be 
the US’s First Big Soccer Star, CNBC (Jan. 2, 2019, 2:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
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The size of the international markets for men’s and women’s soccer, 
the attendance at NWSL games compared to MLS games, and the 
salaries that players on the national teams earn from their professional 
clubs are all relevant to the current dispute because they provide 
context for understanding why the WNT and the MNT take very 
different approaches in their collective bargaining agreements with the 
Federation. The WNT’s collective bargaining agreement (WNT CBA) 
takes a more conservative approach than the collective bargaining 
agreement between the MNT and the Federation (MNT CBA). The 
WNT CBA provides WNT players with a guaranteed salary, but a 
lower potential upside than what MNT players can potentially earn 
under the MNT CBA.  
As explained in more detail below, WNT players are ensured to 
receive payment from the Federation even if they get injured or if the 
NWSL ceases to operate. In contrast, the MNT CBA is structured on a 
“pay-to-play” basis, meaning that MNT players  receive payments from 
the Federation only if they make the national team roster for a particular 
game or tournament; they have no guarantee that they will receive any 
payment if they fail to make the roster for whatever reason, including 
injury or illness. But MNT players are in a position to take more risks 
with their national team salary than WNT players because they earn 
significantly higher professional team salaries than WNT players.  
The smaller market for women’s soccer leads WNT players to 
make less in professional salaries and consequently to take a more 
conservative approach in their collective bargaining agreement with 
the Federation than do MNT players. With lower professional salaries 
and a greater dependence on their national team salaries by WNT 
players, there is a higher potential for tension between WNT players 
and the Federation over those salaries. This potential for dispute is 
compounded by the fact that the Federation also manages and heavily 
subsidizes the NWSL. As explained in the Federation’s financial 
statements:  
The Federation is not a Member of NWSL but, pursuant to the 
NWSL’s limited liability company agreement, was appointed as 
Manager of NWSL and, in this capacity, the Federation performs 
management, governance, operational, administrative, and advisory 
services for NWSL . . . . The Federation does not receive any 
2019/01/02/christian-pulisic-most-expensive-us-soccer-star-after-chelsea-transfer.html 
[https://perma.cc/AWY4-3WZH]. 
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management fees or rent from NWSL as part of the arrangement but 
does receive expense reimbursement.88 
With respect to the payment of WNT players’ NWSL salaries, the 
Federation’s financial statements show the following payments from 
the Federation to the NWSL over the last four years (see Table 3):  
Table 3. Federation Payments to the NWSL 





All these ties between the Federation and the NWSL means that 
WNT players are highly dependent upon the Federation for both their 
national team and professional team salaries.  
The smaller market for women’s soccer as compared to men’s 
soccer, the resulting lower salaries for top female players relative to 
male players, and the significantly greater success by the WNT than 
the MNT have combined to cause a history of disputes between the 
WNT and the Federation. The next Part details the differences between 
the WNT CBA and the MNT CBA. These differences constitute the 
basis for the current lawsuit between the WNT players and the 
Federation.  
III 
TERMS OF THE NATIONAL TEAMS’ COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS 
Against the backdrop of the long history of contention between the 
WNT and the Federation, the current dispute relates specifically to the 
terms of the WNT’s collective bargaining agreement in comparison to 
88 2018 Audited Financial Statements, supra note 70, at 22. 
89 Id. at 23. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 21. 
92 Id. 
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the MNT’s collective bargaining agreement. These terms are examined 
below.  
A. Annual Base Compensation
The first major difference between the WNT CBA and the MNT 
CBA is that select WNT players, designated as “WNT Contracted 
Players,” receive a guaranteed annual salary of $100,000 from the 
Federation for playing for the national team. This salary is called 
“Annual Base Compensation” in the WNT CBA. Each year, the 
Federation designates which players receive the Annual Base 
Compensation, with the number of WNT Contracted Players starting at 
twenty in 2017, the first year of the CBA, and decreasing by one player 
each year so that in 2021, the final year of the CBA, there will be 
sixteen WNT Contracted Players. The Annual Base Compensation is 
due to the WNT Contracted Players no matter how many games the 
WNT plays and regardless of whether or not the WNT Contracted 
Player actually plays in those games. The Federation is permitted to 
terminate a Player’s status as a WNT Contracted Player, but if it does, 
the Player is entitled to up to four months of severance pay. In addition, 
the WNT CBA provides that the USSF will continue to pay a WNT 
Contracted Player’s salary and benefits for up to one year if the Player 
is injured.  
In contrast, the MNT CBA has no guaranteed payments for the 
members of the MNT. The MNT CBA is structured as a “straight pay-
to-play system,” meaning that MNT players are paid only if they make 
the roster for a particular game or tournament. If an MNT player is 
injured and cannot make the team’s roster, he receives no payments 
from the Federation.  
B. Professional Team Salary
As explained earlier, for WNT players who play professionally in 
the NWSL (which all the current WNT players do), the Federation pays 
their NWSL salaries. In 2019, the NWSL salary was set at $72,500 for 
eleven “Tier 1” players and $67,500 for another eleven “Tier 2” 
players.93 This is in addition to the Annual Base Compensation of 
$100,000 described above, which WNT Contracted Players receive for 
playing for the national team.  
93 Women’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 9(D)(1). 
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The Federation does not pay any professional team salaries for MNT 
players.94  
C. Game Bonuses
To understand the game bonus provisions of the two teams’ CBAs, 
it is first necessary to understand that national teams play different 
types of games. First, national teams play so-called “friendlies,” which 
are exhibition matches. Second, teams play tournament qualification 
games, which determine whether a team will participate in a particular 
tournament, like the World Cup. Not all national teams qualify to play 
in every tournament. For example, because of the MNT’s record in 
qualification games leading up to the 2018 Men’s World Cup, the team 
did not qualify to play in that tournament. Third, the teams play in 
actual tournament games. The World Cup is only one of the 
tournaments that the MNT and the WNT play in.95 Finally, depending 
on a team’s performance in a particular tournament, the team may play 
in “victory tour” games. For example, the WNT has played victory tour 
games after winning the Women’s World Cup.  
Players for the WNT and the MNT are paid different amounts for 
each type of game, with the amounts varying based on the outcome of 
the game and, in some instances, the quality of the opponent. In their 
current lawsuit against the Federation, WNT players allege that the 
game bonus provisions in their CBA discriminate against them when 
compared to the MNT CBA. For example, each player on the WNT 
receives $8,500 if the team wins a friendly against a top-ranked 
opponent. The men, in contrast, receive $17,625 each for a victory 
against a top-ranked opponent in a friendly. Moreover, the men receive 
$5,000 for a loss in a friendly against an opponent of any rank. The 
women are paid game bonuses in friendlies only for wins or ties; they 
receive nothing if they lose a friendly.  
94 U.S. Soccer Federation & Men’s Nat’l Team Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining 
Agreement Exhibit A (2011–18) [hereinafter Men’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining 
Agreement] (containing the 2011–18 Men’s National Team Uniform Player Agreement, 
wage and bonus information, and sponsor appearance fee schedule). 
95 Other tournaments played in by the WNT include the Summer Olympics (every four 
years), the SheBelieves Cup (annually), and the Four Nations Tournament (upon invitation 
by China, which hosts the tournament). Other tournaments played in by the MNT include 
the Gold Cup (every two years) and the Confederations Cup (held every four years with 
participants determined by qualification; it discontinued after 2017). In 2016, the MNT also 
played in the Copa America Centenario Tournament, by invitation. Competitions, U.S. 
SOCCER (2020), http://www.ussoccer.com/competitions [https://perma.cc/7KKE-9KAX] 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2020). 
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The game bonus payments are even more disparate for tournament 
qualifying games. For example, a member of the WNT receives a 
maximum of $3,000 for a win in a World Cup qualifying match. A 
member of the MNT may receive up to $18,125 for a World Cup 
qualifying win. And again, the WNT players receive nothing for a 
World Cup qualifying loss, while the men receive $5,000 for such a 
loss.  
In addition, while the members of the WNT receive various 
tournament bonuses,96 they do not receive bonus payments for 
individual games in tournaments. In contrast, members of the MNT 
receive both tournament bonuses and game bonuses for the team’s 
results in individual tournament games. For example, each MNT player 
would have received the following payments for first-round games in 
the 2018 Men’s World Cup if the team had qualified: $6,875 for every 
loss; $16,386 for every tie; and $35,408 for every win. With three first-
round games, an MNT player could have earned approximately 
$106,000 in game bonuses if the team had qualified and won all three 
first-round games in the 2018 Men’s World Cup. In actuality, however, 
because the MNT did not qualify for the tournament, the players earned 
none of these potential World Cup game bonuses. 
Finally, with respect to game bonuses, members of the WNT receive 
payments for victory tour games. Under the WNT CBA, each member 
of the WNT received approximately $60,800 for participating in four 
victory tour games following the 2019 Women’s World Cup. This 
amount received would have been lower if the team had finished 
second or third in the tournament. The MNT CBA does not provide for 
any comparable victory tour payments.  
D. Tournament Bonuses
In addition to game bonuses, players from both teams receive certain 
bonuses for qualifying for tournaments, making the roster to play in 
tournaments, and the team’s performance in tournaments. For example, 
each WNT player received a $75,000 bonus based on the team’s 
qualification for and the player making the roster for the 2019 
Women’s World Cup. A member of the MNT would have received 
$177,445 if the team had qualified and the player had made the roster 
for the 2018 Men’s World Cup. Of course, the MNT players received 
none of these payments because the MNT did not qualify for the 
tournament.  
96 See infra Section III.D. 
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For winning the 2019 Women’s World Cup, each WNT player 
received a $110,000 bonus. If the MNT had won the 2018 Men’s World 
Cup, each member of the MNT would have received a tournament 
bonus of approximately $1,065,217. Again, because the MNT did not 
even make the tournament, the MNT players received none of this 
tournament bonus.  
Table 4 summarizes the various payments provided for under the 
teams’ collective bargaining agreements. 
Table 4.  Payments for WNT and MNT Players 
Type of Payment WNT Player MNT Player 
Guaranteed Payments 
Annual Base Compensation $100,000 $0 
Professional Team Salary (2019) $67,500–$72,500 $0 
Game Bonuses 
Friendly (top-ranked opponent) 
Win $8,500 $17,625 
Tie $1,750 $8,125 
Loss $0 $5,000 
World Cup Qualifier 
Win $3,000 $18,125 
Tie $500 $10,000 
Loss $0 $5,000 
World Cup First-Round Game Bonuses 
Win $0 $35,408 
Tie $0 $16,386 
Loss $0 $6,875 
World Cup Victory Tour $60,800 $0 
World Cup Tournament Bonuses 
World Cup Qualification and 
Roster Bonus $75,000 $177,445 
World Cup First Place Bonus $110,000 $1,065,217 
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E. Other Elements of CBAs
The WNT CBA also covers other benefits such as health, dental, and 
vision insurance, as well as maternity/adoption leave.97 The MNT CBA 
does not provide health, dental, or vision insurance to MNT players. It 
also does not address the issues of paternity/adoption leave.  
IV 
ASSESSMENT OF WNT PLAYERS’ CLAIMS 
The lawsuit brought by the WNT players asserts claims against the 
Federation under both the Equal Pay Act98 and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.99 According to the players’ complaint: 
The [Federation] discriminates against Plaintiffs, and the class 
that they seek to represent, by paying them less than members of the 
MNT for substantially equal work and by denying them at least equal 
playing, training, and travel conditions; equal promotion of their 
games; equal support and development for their games; and other 
terms and conditions of employment equal to the MNT.100  
Under the Equal Pay Act (the EPA): 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this 
section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such 
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by 
paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less 
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite 
sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of 
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are 
performed under similar working conditions, except where such 
payment is made pursuant to . . . (iv) a differential based on any other 
factor other than sex . . . .101  
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of 
sex, including discrimination in employment compensation. “[EPA] 
standards apply to Title VII discrimination claims of ‘unequal pay for 
equal work’ . . . .”102 Moreover, like the EPA, Title VII provides an 
affirmative defense if unequal payments are based on “a differential 
based on any other factor other than sex.”103  
97 Women’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 12(A), (C). 
98 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018).  
99 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2018).  
100 Spies-Gans, supra note 34, ¶ 4. 
101 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
102 Price v. N. States Power Co., 664 F.3d 1186, 1191 (8th Cir. 2011).  
103 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).  
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As articulated by the Eighth Circuit: 
The EPA prohibits pay discrimination on the basis of sex. A 
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case that women were paid 
less than men in the same establishment for equal work requiring 
equal skill, effort, and responsibility and performed under similar 
working conditions. If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant to prove one of four statutory 
affirmative defenses. Those defenses require an employer to prove 
that any wage differential is explained by “[among other things] . . . 
(iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”104
Therefore, in assessing the strength of the players’ pay-based claims, 
relevant considerations include whether (1) the WNT and MNT are 
employed within the “same establishment”; (2) WNT players are paid 
at a rate less than the rate at which the Federation pays MNT players; 
(3) the WNT and the MNT are engaged in “equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . .
performed under similar working conditions”; and (4) the disparate
payment schemes under the WNT CBA and the MNT CBA are “based
on any other factor other than sex.”
A. The “Same Establishment”
To come within the scope of the EPA, plaintiffs and comparator 
employees must be employed within the same “establishment.” The 
term “establishment” is not defined in the EPA, but the Ninth Circuit 
has interpreted the term using a “hybrid functional approach.”105 This 
means that the court has refused to apply the EPA to “separate offices 
of an employer that are geographically and operationally distinct.”106  
Federal regulations also provide guidance on the meaning of the 
term “establishment” as used in the statute. EEOC regulations state that 
establishment refers to “a distinct physical place of business rather than 
to an entire business or ‘enterprise’ which may include several separate 
places of business.”107 Therefore, “each physically separate place of 
business is ordinarily considered a separate establishment.”108 The 
regulation goes on to state that only in “unusual circumstances” 
may “two or more distinct physical portions of a business enterprise 
104 Price, 664 F.3d at 1191 (internal citations omitted). 
105 Winther v. City of Portland, 1994 WL 118167, 21 F.3d 1119 at *1 (9th Cir. 1994). 
106 Id. (emphasis added). 
107 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(a) (2019).  
108 Id. 
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be[] treated as a single establishment.”109 Such treatment may be 
appropriate where “a central administrative unit may hire all 
employees, set wages, and assign the location of employment; 
employees frequently interchange work locations; and daily duties may 
be virtually identical and performed under similar working 
conditions.”110 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Winther v. City of Portland111 helps 
in understanding the relevance of geographical and operational factors 
in assessing whether WNT players and MNT players are employed 
in the same establishment for purposes of the EPA. In Winther, 
the plaintiff worked for the Portland Bureau of Emergency 
Communications (BOEC) handling emergency police calls. She 
contended that she was underpaid in comparison to male employees of 
the Portland Fire Alarm Dispatch (FAD), which as the name indicates, 
handled emergency calls relating to the Portland Fire Department.  
The Winther court began its analysis by stating that to determine 
what constitutes an establishment under the EPA the court had to 
consider “the nature of the services provided and the degree of central 
administration, such as budgeting, hiring, and day-to-day management, 
as well as the extent of physical separation.”112 As to the physical 
component, the court said this “is a common-sense notion that refers to 
whether offices are physically contiguous or not.”113 Because the 
BOEC and FAD were not located in contiguous buildings, they were 
deemed physically separate. 
As to operational considerations, the court said that the BOEC and 
FAD shared a centralized administration “at only the most general 
level.”114 While job classifications and salaries were determined 
centrally, the BOEC and FAD had separate collective bargaining 
agreements, budgets, management, hiring authority, and training.115 
In addition, the departments served different functions and there was 
no interchange of personnel between them.116 All these considerations 
led the court to conclude that the BOEC and FAD were separate 
establishments, and therefore comparisons of employees’ salaries 
109 29 C.F.R. § 1620.9(b). 
110 Id. 
111 Winther, 21 F.3d at *1. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at *2. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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between the two departments could not serve as the basis for an EPA 
claim.117  
The WNT and the MNT share many of the same characteristics as 
the different departments in Winther. While the Federation provides 
general, centralized oversight of each of the teams, the two teams are 
each subject to separate management (their respective coaches) and 
each have their own collective bargaining agreements.118 Players for 
each team are selected by the team’s coach, not by the Federation.119 
Also, based on FIFA rules, the transfer of players between the WNT 
and the MNT is prohibited.120 And according to the Federation, the two 
teams have “separate budgets that take into account the different 
revenue that the teams generate.”121 In addition, although the teams 
play the same sport, they effectively operate in different markets. The 
MNT operates in the market for men’s soccer and the WNT operates 
in the market for women’s soccer, as explained above. In effect, the 
Federation operates the teams as separate lines of business. 
117 Id.; see also Price v. N. States Power Co., 664 F.3d 1186, 1191 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that offices seventy-five miles apart, under separate supervision, and serving 
different customers did not constitute an establishment under the Equal Pay Act); Foster v. 
Arcata Assocs. Inc., 772 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that separate offices of a 
business did not constitute an establishment under the EPA where the offices had separate 
budgets, independent management, and served different functions). But see Brennan v. 
Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that eleven 
elementary schools within a single school district constituted an establishment under the 
Equal Pay Act because a central authority was responsible for school janitors’ employment 
and wages and also transferred the janitors from one school to another).  
118 See Gregg Berhalter to Be Head Coach of USA Men’s National Soccer Team, 
GLOBAL TEAM EVENTS, https://globalteamevents.com/gregg-berhalter-head-coach-usa-
mens-national-soccer-team/ [https://perma.cc/9EZ7-GVC6] (last visited Feb. 9, 2020); 
Vlatko Andonovski Named Head Coach of U.S. Women’s National Team, U.S. SOCCER 
(Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.ussoccer.com/stories/2019/10/vlatko-andonovski-named-
head-coach-of-us-womens-national-team [https://perma.cc/K6T6-9M69]. 
119 Alicia Rodriguez, Why Has the USMNT Struggled? Start with How It Selects Players, 
SBNATION (Jan. 29, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.sbnation.com/2019/1/29/18199509/ 
usmnt-roster-pool-demographics-latinx-foreign-born-players [https://perma.cc/MMX4-
S9HL] (discussing how the coach identifies the players he would like in the USMNT player 
pool). 
120 “FIFA competitions are separated for men and women.” REGULATIONS: FIFA 
GENDER VERIFICATION, FIFA 4 (2011), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/regulations
-fifa-gender-verification-1454202.pdf?cloudid=ihf3yx6kw3insqt6r0i6 [https://perma.cc/
A84P-5NRY]. Specifically, “[f]or FIFA’s men’s competitions, only men are eligible to play.
For FIFA’s women’s competitions, only women are eligible to play.” Id. at 7.
121 Plaintiffs’ Collective Action Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 70. 
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The issue of physical location is different for the teams than for a 
typical business. The Federation is headquartered in Chicago,122 but 
the teams train and play in tournaments at various and different 
locations around the world. For example, in advance of the 2019 
Women’s World Cup tournament in France, the WNT held a training 
camp in Portugal.123 Meanwhile, the MNT trained in Chula Vista, 
California, in advance of their performance in the Gold Cup 
Tournament, which was also played in the summer of 2019 in various 
cities within the United States.124  
Based on these factors, it is feasible that a court could find that the 
WNT and the MNT do not constitute a single establishment for EPA 
purposes. If, however, the WNT players prevail on this issue because 
of the ultimate oversight of both teams by the Federation, WNT must 
also show that they are paid at a lower rate than the MNT players and 
that WNT players perform equal work to the MNT players. Finally, if 
the WNT players can make those showings, the Federation may still 
present as an affirmative defense that any disparity in payments 
between WNT players and MNT players is based on factors other than 
sex. A discussion of these issues follows.  
B. Rate of Pay
The issue of whether the Federation pays WNT players at a rate less 
than it pays MNT players is complicated by the fact that game bonus, 
tournament bonus, and victory tour payments are all contingent on how 
the teams perform. Unquestionably, however, the MNT CBA provides 
for higher potential payments. A simple example illustrates this: if the 
MNT had won the 2018 Men’s World Cup, each player on the team’s 
World Cup roster would have received at least $1,250,000 from the 
Federation for the tournament.125 For winning the 2019 Women’s 
122 See Chicago: Home to U.S. Soccer House, U.S. SOCCER, https://www.ussoccer. 
com/history/us-soccer-house [https://perma.cc/5FAX-TYEX] (last visited Feb. 10, 2020) 
(describing the U.S. Soccer House, which serves as the headquarters for the Federation).  
123 James Nalton, USWNT Prepare for World Cup with Training Camp in Portugal, 
INT’L CHAMPIONS CUP (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.internationalchampionscup.com/en/ 
articles/uswnt-world-cup-preparations-january-training-camp [https://perma.cc/RUB7-
TC5Z].  
124 Berhalter Calls 27 Players to Chula Vista for U.S. MNT’s 2019 January Camp, U.S. 
SOCCER (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.ussoccer.com/stories/2018/12/berhalter-calls-27-
players-to-chula-vista-for-us-mnts-2019-january-camp [https://perma.cc/27FU-JRB6]. 
125 This figure is composed of the $108,695 for qualification ($2,500,000 / 23); $28,532 
for first-round points bonus (($218,750 x 3) / 23; three points is the minimum number of 
points needed to advance past the first round, though it is likely that a team advancing past 
the first round will have significantly more than three points); $48,125 for the World Cup 
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World Cup, a WNT Contracted Player received at least $346,870 from 
the Federation.126  
Thus, the Federation would pay MNT players at a rate of almost four 
times what it pays WNT players for winning their respective World 
Cup tournaments.127 That said, the MNT did not win the 2018 Men’s 
World Cup—as previously explained, the MNT did not qualify for the 
tournament. Consequently, the WNT players will receive significantly 
higher pay for their most recent World Cup performance, as compared 
to what the MNT received for theirs. Had the WNT also failed to 
qualify for their World Cup tournament—unimaginable in light of the 
team’s history of success—WNT Contracted Players still would have 
received their $100,000 Annual Base Compensation. So, while the 
MNT CBA provides for higher potential payments, the WNT players 
have in fact received higher payments in some years (and will again in 
2019) based on their team’s success and the lack of success by the 
MNT.  In fact, disclosures required by tax law of the Federation’s 
highest-paid employees over the last several years have shown that in 
two of the three most recent years in which national team players were 
among the Federation’s highest compensated employees, members of 
the WNT rather than the MNT received the highest payments (see 
Table 5). This will certainly be the case for 2019, also a year in which 
the WNT won the Women’s World Cup.   
per game payment ($6,875 x 7 games); $195,652 for advancing to the second round 
($4,500,000 / 23); $217,391 for the quarterfinal bonus ($5,000,000 / 23); $244,565 for the 
semifinal bonus ($5,625,000 / 23); and $407,609 for the first place bonus ($9,375,000 / 23). 
This figure does not include any payments for World Cup Qualifying or friendly matches. 
Men’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 94, at Exhibit A.  
126 This figure is composed of the $100,000 Annual Base Compensation for a WNT 
Contracted Player; $75,000 for World Cup Qualifying and World Cup Roster Bonus 
($37,500 for each); $110,000 for first place finish in the World Cup ($2,530,000 / 23); and 
$60,870 for participating in the four games of the World Cup victory tour ($1,400,000 / 23). 
A WNT Contracted Player would, in reality, make more than this based on the team’s 
performance in World Cup Qualifying and friendly matches. Women’s Nat’l Team 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 81, at Exhibit A.  
127 $1,250,000 / $346,870 = 3.6. Men’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement 
supra note 94; Women’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 81. 
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Table 5. Players Listed in Tax Disclosures of Highest Compensated 
Employees128 
Fiscal Year Name Team Salary 
2018 Christen Press WNT $257,920 
Rebecca Sauerbrunn WNT $256,720 
Kelly O’Hara WNT $256,695 
Samantha Mewis WNT $247,497 
2016–17 No Players Listed 
2015–16 Lauren Holiday WNT $225,450 
Meghan Klingenberg WNT $225,450 
Alexandria Krieger WNT $225,450 
Tobin Heath WNT $225,450 
2014–15129 Clinton Dempsey MNT $428,002 
Geoffrey Cameron MNT $405,209 
Josmer Altidore MNT $404,703 
Timothy Howard MNT $398,495 
Jermaine Jones MNT $395,920 
Federation President Carlos Cordeiro contends that from 2010 to 
2018 the Federation paid WNT players more than MNT players if FIFA 
prize money payments are not taken into account.130 According to 
Cordeiro, over that time period, the Federation paid WNT players 
128 Information in this table is taken from the Federation’s Form 990s as reported to the 
IRS. See Financial Information: Form 990 and Audited Financial Statements, U.S. SOCCER, 
https://www.ussoccer.com/governance/financial-information [https://perma.cc/W55F-S9UD]. 
It is not clear whether these figures include NWSL salaries.  
129 Payments from fiscal year 2014–15 included payments related to the MNT’s 
qualification for and performance in the 2014 Men’s World Cup. The Federation’s fiscal 
year runs from April 1 through March 31, so the 2015 fiscal year (Apr. 1, 2014–Mar. 31, 
2015) included the 2014 Men’s World Cup, which took place in June 2014.  
130 Cordeiro Letter to Membership, supra note 7. 
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$34.1 million in salaries and bonuses while paying MNT players $26.4 
million.131 When FIFA prize money is included, Cordeiro reports that 
WNT players have received $39.7 million from the Federation, 
compared to $41 million for MNT players.132 Cordeiro justifies 
excluding FIFA prize money from the payment calculations by stating 
that money is “[s]eparate and apart from any funds controlled by U.S. 
Soccer.”133 Cordeiro’s justification overstates the Federation’s lack 
of control, however, as FIFA prize money is paid to national 
associations (like the Federation), and those national associations then 
pay some portion of the prize money to its players under the terms of 
their collective bargaining agreement. For example, FIFA awarded 
$4 million to the Federation for the WNT’s victory in the 2019 
Women’s World Cup.134 Under the WNT CBA, the WNT received 
$2.53 million of that prize money.135  
In addition, the figures cited by Cordeiro include payments made by 
the Federation to the NWSL for WNT Contracted Players’ salaries. 
Those payments started in 2013.136 While the financial and managerial 
support given by the Federation to the NWSL has helped the league 
survive, WNT players perform extra services for their NWSL salaries 
not performed by MNT players. Specifically, NWSL teams play 
twenty-four regular season games.137  
The higher total payments to top-earning WNT players in some 
years introduce doubt about whether WNT players can satisfy the 
requirement for their EPA claim that the Federation pays WNT players 
at a rate less than the rate at which it pays MNT players. That said, at 
least one court has held that different pay arrangements between men 
and women violate the EPA even if those arrangements result in 
substantially equal remuneration to both groups.  
In Bence v. Detroit Health Corporation, the Sixth Circuit reviewed 
the compensation model used by a national health spa business that 




134 See FIFA FINANCIAL REPORT 2018, supra note 56.  
135 See Women’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 81, at 
Exhibit A. 
136 See Financial Statements, U.S. SOCCER FEDERATION 20–21 (2013), https://www. 
ussoccer.com/governance/financial-information [https://perma.cc/3XPR-FBMC].  
137 Celia Balf, NWSL Announces Full 2019 Schedule, NWSL SOCCER (Feb. 22, 2019), 
http://www.nwslsoccer.com/news/article/nwsl-announces-full-2019-schedule 
[https://perma.cc/D6MZ-GTUH]. 
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memberships while paying male employees a commission rate of 
7.5%.138 The employer divided spa operations into a men’s division 
and a women’s division, which operated on alternate days.139 Male 
employees operated the men’s division and female employees operated 
the women’s division.140 Thus, male employees sold spa memberships 
exclusively to men and female employees sold memberships only to 
women. The employer justified the different commission rates between 
men and women based on the fact that historical sales data showed 60% 
of all sales occurred to female clients and 40% occurred to male 
clients.141 In other words, the market for female spa membership was 
50% larger than the market for male spa memberships. The employer 
reasoned that by paying its male employees a 50% higher commission 
rate than its female employees, the male and female employees would 
earn approximately equal amounts in total commission payments.142 
This proved correct, as the court noted that the “total remuneration 
received by males and females was substantially equal although the 
females made more sales than the males.”143  
Despite the substantially equal total remuneration between the male 
and female employees, the Sixth Circuit held that the commission 
arrangement violated the EPA.144 The court found a violation because 
the lower commission rate for women “effectively locked female 
employees, and only female employees, into an inferior position 
regardless of their effort or productivity.”145 Thus, even if a court 
accepts the argument made by Federation President Cordeiro that WNT 
players made more than MNT players, which hinges on excluding 
FIFA bonuses from the calculation, WNT players may still have a 
colorable disparate pay claim. That is, a court could still find that the 
rate of pay under the WNT CBA discriminates against WNT players 
because of the higher game and tournament bonuses or because of the 
potential for higher total payments under the MNT CBA.146 Assuming 
138 Bence v. Detroit Health Corp., 712 F.2d 1024, 1026 (6th Cir. 1983). 
139 Id. at 1025.  
140 Id. at 1025–26. 
141 Id. at 1027. 
142 Id. at 1026. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 1031. 
145 Id. 
146 But see Sowell v. Alumina Ceramics, Inc., 251 F.3d 678, 684 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the plaintiff, a female toolmaker, “was paid the same as, or more than, at least some 
male tool makers in the tool room,” and failed to establish a prima facie case of wage 
discrimination). 
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the WNT players’ claims survive this step of the analysis, the WNT 
players must also show that they are performing “equal work” to the 
male players.  
C. “Equal Work”
As stated earlier, the EPA prohibits wage discrimination “for equal 
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and 
responsibility, and which are performed under similar work conditions, 
except where such payment is made pursuant to . . . a differential based 
on any other factor other than sex.”147 As explained by Judge Posner, 
“whether two jobs are the same depends on how fine a system of job 
classifications the courts will accept.”148 Judge Posner explained that 
the legislative history of the EPA indicated that “comparable” jobs do 
not satisfy the “equal work” requirement.149 Rather, to come within the 
scope of the EPA jobs must “be virtually identical, that is, they would 
be very much alike or closely related to each other.”150 Other courts 
have stated that jobs need not be identical to be equal, but they must be 
“substantially equal.”151  
The WNT players contend that they perform equal work to the MNT 
players because, like the male players on the MNT, they “travel 
nationally and internationally as necessary for competitive games, 
which are the same in length, physical and mental demand, and playing 
environment and conditions throughout the United States and 
globally.”152 Moreover, like the MNT players, the WNT players “must 
adhere to the same rules of the game of soccer as established by 
[FIFA].”153 In particular, they “play on the same size field; use the 
same size ball; have the same duration of matches and play by the same 
rules regarding start and restart of play, offside, fouls and misconduct, 
free kicks, penalty kicks, throw-ins, goal kicks, corner kicks, etc.”154 
147 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2018).  
148 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Madison Cmty Unit Sch. Dist. No. 12, 818 
F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1987).
149 Id. at 582.
150 Id. (emphasis added).
151 See, e.g., Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 1973) (“It is
now well settled, however, that the jobs under analysis need not be identical in every respect 
before the Equal Pay Act is applicable; inconsequential differences can be disregarded as 
long as the jobs are ‘substantially equal.’”).  
152 Spies-Gans, supra note 34, ¶ 47. 
153 Id. ¶ 48.  
154 Id. The equal treatment of women’s soccer under the rules of the sport are confirmed 
in the most recent edition of the Laws of the Game. See THE INT’L FOOTBALL ASS’N BD., 
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The Federation, on the other hand, contends that WNT players do not 
perform equal work because the WNT and MNT “play at different 
times, in different locations, [and] against different opponents.”155  
Courts have used a case-by-case, fact-intensive approach to 
determine whether two jobs involve “equal skill, effort and 
responsibility.” As stated in EEOC regulations, “What constitutes 
equal skill, equal effort, or equal responsibility cannot be precisely 
defined.”156 Rather, this analysis often turns on a detailed examination 
of job duties and responsibilities. Both the WNT CBA and the MNT 
CBA expressly set forth the duties and responsibilities of women’s and 
men’s national team players.157 These include:  
• Playing duties—players must be fit and available for training and
games, unless excused for good cause;
• Spokesperson duties—players shall serve as spokespersons for
soccer and devote reasonable best efforts to promoting the sport;
• Time commitment—players must devote the time necessary to
fulfill duties as a player and spokesperson;
• Post-game hospitality—players shall attend post-game
hospitality functions unless excused for good cause;
• Conduct—players shall comport themselves as befitting
membership on the national team;
• Federation rules—players must agree to comply with all
reasonable rules and regulations of the Federation;
• Drug testing—players must consent to drug testing;
• Media sessions and interviews—players must participate in a
reasonable number of media sessions and interviews;
• Hazardous activities—players agree not to engage in specified
hazardous activities that involve a significant risk of personal
injury.
Given the identical duties and responsibilities for players on both teams 
as set forth in their respective CBAs, there is a strong argument that 
LAWS OF THE GAME 26 (2019), http://static-3eb8.kxcdn.com/files/document-category/ 
062019/frRhKJNjSBAtiyt.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR2N-ZL9D] (stating that “women’s 
football is no longer a separate category and now has the same status as men’s football”). 
155 Defendant United States Soccer Federation’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to 
Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 1, at 1, Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-01717-RGK-
AGR (May 6, 2019). 
156 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(a) (2019). 
157 See Women’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 81, at art. 
10; Men’s Nat’l Team Collective Bargaining Agreement, Uniform Player Agreement, supra 
note 94, § 1.  
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they are engaged in equal work. Of course, some will contend, as the 
Federation has, that the teams’ work is unequal because they compete 
against different opponents in different tournaments. Others may argue 
that because of the faster and more physical nature of the men’s game, 
the players’ work is inherently unequal. But as illustrated in Bence, 
even if employees operate in different markets and the difficulty of 
achieving success in those markets varies, the court may still conclude 
that those employees perform equal work.  
The key to the “equal work” analysis is whether the employees 
perform the same tasks and hold the same duties and responsibilities as 
one another.158 The fact that employees operate in different markets is 
not determinative.159 Therefore, based on the express terms of the 
WNT and MNT collective bargaining agreements, a court is likely to 
find this element satisfied.  
Nevertheless, even if the WNT players succeed in showing that they 
work in the same establishment as the MNT players, that they are paid 
at a lower rate than the men, and that they perform equal work, the 
Federation may still prevail if it can show that the WNT players’ 
salaries are based on a factor “other than sex.”  
D. “Other than Sex”
Two factors “other than sex” potentially justify the Federation’s 
payment of different salaries to the WNT players and the MNT players. 
The first is the economic market in which the two teams operate, and 
the resulting difference in revenue that they generate. The second is the 
different risk tolerances of the WNT and the MNT players, which 
explain the very different structures of the teams’ CBAs.  
As to the economic differences, the discussion above explained that 
the market for men’s soccer is significantly larger than the market for 
women’s soccer, particularly on the international level. As previously 
explained, FIFA states that it derives 95% of its broadcast revenue from 
the Men’s World Cup, and the 2018 Men’s World Cup generated over 
158 See Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir. 1986) (“The crucial finding on 
the equal work issue is whether the jobs to be compared have a ‘common core’ of tasks, i.e., 
whether a significant portion of the two jobs is identical. The inquiry then turns to whether 
the differing or additional tasks make the work substantially different.” (quoting Brobst v. 
Columbus Servs. Int’l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1985))).  
159 See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.14(c) (“[T]he fact that jobs are performed in different 
departments or locations within the establishment would not necessarily be sufficient to 
demonstrate that unequal work is involved where the equal pay standard otherwise 
applies.”). 
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$5 billion in revenue. Courts have often held that revenue generation 
constitutes a legitimate reason “other than sex” for disparate salary 
arrangements.  
For example, in Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., the Third 
Circuit held that economic benefit to the employer is a “reason other 
than sex” justifying salary differences.160 In Robert Hall, the Secretary 
of Labor sued a clothing store that compensated its male employees at 
a higher rate than its female employees. According to the court, only 
male salespeople worked in the men’s clothing department and only 
female salespeople worked in the women’s clothing department 
because “the frequent necessity for physical contact between the sales 
persons and the customers . . . would embarrass both and would inhibit 
sales unless they were of the same sex.”161 The court noted that the 
“merchandise in the men’s department was, on the average, of higher 
price and better quality than the merchandise in the women’s 
department; and Robert Hall’s profit margin on the men’s clothing was 
higher than its margin on the women’s clothing.”162 As a result, the 
“men’s department at all times showed a larger dollar volume in gross 
sales, and a greater gross profit.”163 Salespeople working at Robert Hall 
received both a base salary and incentive payments, with both higher 
for the male employees than for the female employees. The company 
explained the wage disparity by citing “economic factors, i.e., the 
higher profitability of the men’s department allowed it to pay the men 
more, and the lower profitability of the women’s department forced 
Robert Hall to pay the workers in that department less.”164  
In considering whether the company’s disparate payments were 
based on a factor “other than sex,” the Third Circuit stated that “the 
economic benefits to an employer could justify a wage differential.”165 
Thus, even though the male and female employees were performing 
equal work—both were selling clothing—the payment scheme used by 
Robert Hall did not violate the EPA. The court explained that 
[i]t might take no more effort or skill to sell two different pairs of ten
dollar shoes; but if the employer makes a four dollar profit on one
pair as opposed to a two dollar profit on the other, the Secretary [of
160 Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1973). 
161 Id. at 592 (quoting Hodgson v. Robert Hall, 326 F. Supp. 1264, 1269 (D. Del. 1971)). 
162 Id. at 590.  
163 Id. at 590–91.  
164 Id. at 592.  
165 Id. at 594.  
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Labor, based on the language of the Equal Pay Act and guidance 
issued] apparently allows a higher commission rate.166 
Summarizing its decision in favor of the employer, the court stated: 
The overwhelming evidence which showed that the men’s 
department was more profitable than the women’s was sufficient to 
justify the difference in base salary. These statistics proved that 
Robert Hall’s wage differentials were not based on sex but instead 
fully supported the reasoned business judgment that the sellers of 
women’s clothing could not be paid as much as the sellers of men’s 
clothing. Robert Hall’s executives testified that it was their practice 
to base their wage rates on these departmental figures.167 
Courts have also recognized the relevance of an employee’s 
economic benefit to the employer in the athletic context. Female 
coaches who receive lower pay than their male counterparts have often 
challenged their salaries under the EPA and Title VII. One such case is 
Stanley v. University of Southern California, a Ninth Circuit 
decision.168 In Stanley, the court rejected the EPA claim brought by 
Marianne Stanley, the former head coach of the USC women’s 
basketball team, even though the women’s team enjoyed more 
postseason success than the men’s team during Coach Stanley’s four-
year tenure as coach.169 First, the court found that Coach Stanley’s job 
was not “equal work” compared to the men’s coach because coaching 
the men’s team required “substantial public relations and promotional 
activities” that did not apply to Coach Stanley’s position.170  
In addition, the court stated that “revenue generation is an important 
factor that may be considered in justifying greater pay.”171 Over Coach 
Stanley’s four years at USC, the women’s basketball team generated 
revenue of $50,262.172 During that same period of time, the men’s team 
brought in revenue of $4,725,784.173 The court further rejected Coach 
Stanley’s arguments that this difference in revenue resulted from 
unequal marketing efforts by the school and gender discrimination by 
sports fans. As to marketing, the court said that USC’s decision to 
166 Id. at 595.  
167 Id. at 597.  
168 Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994). 
169 The Ninth Circuit did not specify how much less the women’s team coach made than 
the men’s team coach in Stanley, stating only that the district court “reviewed Coach 
Raveling’s [the men’s team coach] employment contract in camera.” Id. at 1318.  
170 Id. at 1321.  
171 Id. at 1323. 
172 Id. at 1322 n.1. 
173 Id. 
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invest more money into marketing the men’s basketball team 
“demonstrates, at best, a business decision to allocate USC resources 
to the team that generates the most revenue.”174 The Ninth Circuit also 
agreed with the district court that “societal discrimination in preferring 
to witness men’s sports in greater numbers cannot be attributed to 
USC.”175 For all these reasons, the court rejected Coach Stanley’s EPA 
claim. Other courts have reached the same result in lawsuits involving 
female coaches whose teams generate less revenue than the teams of 
male comparator coaches.176  
One final example, outside the sports context, illustrates the 
relevance of revenue generation in salary determination, even if the 
plaintiff’s job performance is strong. In Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & 
Co.,177 the district court for the Southern District of New York affirmed 
an arbitration panel’s finding of no violation of the EPA where the 
plaintiff contended that she received lower compensation than other 
managing directors at her investment banking firm. The court found 
that factors other than sex explained the compensation disparity. In 
particular, these factors included “profitability, market value, revenue 
generation, client relationships, product development abilities, product 
knowledge, leadership abilities and corporate citizenship.”178 Sobol 
headed Kidder, Peabody’s utility industry group, which the defendant 
characterized as “a relatively slow-paced, unprofitable industry 
group.”179 In contrast, other groups at the firm such as “Media, 
Environmental, Restructuring, and M&A were ‘busier and more 
profitable.’”180 The defendant justified the pay differential between the 
plaintiff and other managing directors based on profitability: “M & A 
174 Id. at 1323.  
175 Id.  
176 See, e.g., Bartges v. Univ. of N.C. at Charlotte, 908 F. Supp. 1312, 1323, 1326–27 
(W.D.N.C. 1995) (granting summary judgment against the female assistant women’s 
basketball and softball coach because “men’s basketball is the most marketable and largest 
revenue sport at UNCC” and in light of the revenue-generating potential and community 
interest in the sports the plaintiff coached); Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 863 F. Supp. 958, 961 
(D. Minn. 1994) (rejecting disparate pay claims by women’s gymnastics coach based on 
evidence that “the three teams [used for comparison purposes] enjoy[ed] significantly 
greater spectator attendance and generate[d] substantially more revenue for the University 
than the women’s gymnastics team”).  
177 Sobol v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 49 F. Supp. 2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
178 Id. at 215. 
179 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
180 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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deals were highly profitable, utility deals tended to be ‘loss leaders and 
unprofitable.’”181  
The court accepted the employer’s justification for the pay 
inequality. According to the Sobol court, a “firm’s practice of paying 
high revenue generators more than individuals who produce less does 
not violate the EPA.”182 According to the court, “Sobol compared 
herself to three senior M&A bankers who were considered extremely 
valuable assets to the firm” and “the Utility Group’s revenue 
production was sluggish during Sobol’s tenure.”183 Thus, even if 
plaintiff performed high-quality work, the industry group she led was 
less profitable than other industry groups, justifying lower 
compensation and precluding a violation of the EPA.  
With respect to the WNT and the MNT, an examination of the 
Federation’s audited financial statements and annual budget documents 
shows net revenue attributable to the operation of each of the teams 
over the last four years as shown in Table 6.  
Table 6. The Federation’s Net Revenue for the WNT and MNT 
Fiscal Year WNT Net Revenue MNT Net Revenue 
2018 ($5,095,777) $17,088,412 
2017 $903,810 $42,181,508 
2016 $6,777,160 $2,316,739 
2015 ($4,898,049) ($3,356,132) 
Avg. ($578,214) $14,557,631 
These figures, however, warrant some explanation and perhaps 
some skepticism. First, the Federation does not allocate to either team 
any share of the revenue it derives from sponsorships, television, 
licensing, or royalties. Clearly, the national teams are the source of 
181 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
182 Id. at 220. 
183 Id. (citing Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc. 129 F.3d 1355 (10th Cir. 1997)) (finding 
it permissible to pay a female assistant manager less than male assistant managers where the 
female’s department produced less than 10% of revenues produced by the males’ 
departments); see also Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming dismissal 
of discriminatory pay claim; the fact that one attorney brought in substantially more clients 
and revenue than plaintiff afforded the employer an affirmative defense to the EPA claim). 
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much (if not all) of this income, but the Federation’s financial 
statements do not allocate it to either team. Second, the figures for 2017 
and 2018 for the MNT include revenue related to the Copa America 
Centenario tournament. That tournament generated $50 million of 
revenue in fiscal year 2017 and $18.7 million in fiscal year 2018. While 
the MNT performed well in the tournament, the revenue resulted from 
the Federation serving as tournament host. Therefore, while it may be 
fair to attribute this revenue to the MNT (since it comes from a 
tournament in which the MNT participated), the revenue did not result 
directly from the performance of the MNT.184  
All that said, based on average game revenue,185 television 
viewership, and tournament revenue (Copa America Centenario in 
2016; Men’s World Cup upcoming in 2026), the MNT does and will 
generate higher revenue for the Federation than the WNT. Moreover, 
the potential revenue from the MNT is significantly higher, given the 
larger FIFA prize money available for the Men’s World Cup ($400 
million in 2018) compared to the Women’s World Cup ($30 million in 
2019). These differences would most likely lead a court to conclude 
that any disparity in pay between WNT players and MNT players is 
based on a factor “other than sex.”  
In addition to a difference in revenue generation, courts have also 
upheld different salary arrangements with male and female employees 
based on the employees’ choice to take or avoid risk. In other words, 
the risk tolerance of the employee has been considered a factor “other 
than sex” justifying disparate pay arrangements. This was illustrated in 
Schleicher v. Preferred Solutions, Inc.,186 where the Sixth Circuit 
found no violation of the EPA even though a male employee was paid 
almost $700,000 more than a female employee over a four-year period. 
The difference in payments between the two employees resulted from 
the male employee agreeing to payments based solely on 20% of a 
profit pool, with no guaranteed base salary; in contrast, the female 
employee opted for a base salary of $100,000 and only 10% of the 
profit pool.187 Despite the significant difference in amounts actually 
paid to these two employees, the court found no violation of the EPA 
because the lower-paid female employee chose the less risky salary 
arrangement. According to the trial court, and as affirmed by the Sixth 
184 Arguably, the strong performance by the MNT increased interest in the tournament 
among the U.S. viewing public, which indirectly increased the Federation’s revenue as host. 
185 See supra Part II. 
186 Schleicher v. Preferred Sols., Inc., 831 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2016). 
187 Id. at 749–50.  
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Circuit, the female employee’s “compensation differential was based 
on a factor other than sex—namely personal choice regarding the risk 
associated with the compensation structure.”188  
Depending on the negotiation history of the WNT CBA, this factor 
could also justify the different arrangements that the WNT players and 
the MNT players have with the Federation. Importantly, in Schleicher 
the court noted that the employer had offered both employees the same 
compensation model: the male employee elected the riskier model, 
while the female employee chose a more conservative approach. The 
Federation has claimed that it was the WNT players who “consistently 
rejected all proposals, most recently offered by U.S. Soccer during 
CBA negotiations in 2017, for a ‘pay-to-play’ structure similar to the 
one that the USMNT players accepted in their collective bargaining 
agreements.”189 In contrast, the WNT players argue that “during 
collective bargaining for a new contract, [the Federation] rejected 
requests for compensation for the WNT players that would have been 
at least equal to that afforded to the male MNT players.”190 The WNT 
players also contend that they proposed to the Federation a revenue-
sharing model, showing their “willingness to share in the risk and 
reward of the economic success of the WNT,” but that the Federation 
“categorically rejected” the proposed model.191 
If the Federation can show that it offered the WNT players an 
arrangement similar to the pay-to-play structure of the MNT CBA, the 
WNT’s rejection of that structure could constitute another basis “other 
than sex” for the different payment structures between the two teams.  
V 
NEXT STEPS 
As analyzed above, the WNT players face an uphill challenge with 
respect to their disparate pay claim. The difference in revenue 
generation and the players’ acceptance of the CBA’s guaranteed 
payment structure make it likely that a court will ultimately reject the 
merits of their claim. Even so, it is understandable and even admirable 
that the WNT players have pressed the issue of equal pay. It is 
understandable because over the thirty-five-year history of the WNT 
188 Id. at 752 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
189 Defendant United States Soccer Federation’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses to 
Plaintiff’s Complaint, supra note 155, ¶ 1. 
190 Plaintiffs’ Collective Action Complaint, supra note 8, ¶ 62. 
191 Id. ¶ 63. 
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the players have had to fight for every step of progress and respect that 
they have achieved. Sometimes that fight has been through threats to 
strike, and sometimes it has been through litigation. Because of the 
team’s remarkable success on the field and the goodwill this has created 
with the American public, the team has made substantial progress for 
the women’s game. Consider the $500 bonus that the WNT players 
received in 1991 for winning the inaugural Women’s World Cup 
compared to the hundreds of thousands of dollars that each team 
member received for their most recent World Cup victory.  
The players’ decision to litigate the current dispute is also admirable 
because they view their role as helping to smooth the way for future 
female athletes. If the WNT players can establish a new precedent for 
better treatment from the Federation, this will assist future generations 
of WNT players. It will also help women on other countries’ national 
teams because those players will be able to point to the WNT as a model 
for how female athletes should be treated by their governing bodies.  
So why should the Federation seek to accommodate the WNT 
players if it has the stronger legal position? Because this is an 
opportunity to advance the Federation’s stated mission. The 
Federation’s mission is “to promote and govern soccer in the United 
States in order to make it the preeminent sport recognized for 
excellence in participating, spectator appeal, international competitions 
and gender equality.”192 The Federation has the opportunity to 
achieve a significant step toward its mission of gender equality by 
recognizing the extraordinary accomplishments of the WNT players 
and compensating them accordingly.  
Of course, the difficult question to answer is what this means—what 
is “equal pay” given the different pay structures for the WNT and the 
MNT as well as the different amount of resources available in light of 
the substantial gap in FIFA prize money between men’s and women’s 
competitions? Absolute equality may be impossible to achieve and may 
not even be desirable. For example, because the MNT failed to qualify 
for the 2018 Men’s World Cup, the MNT players’ salaries from the 
Federation for the 2018–19 fiscal year were lower than the salaries of 
the WNT players. Likewise, because of their victory in the 2019 
Women’s World Cup, the WNT players’ salaries will be higher in fiscal 
year 2019–20 than the salaries of the MNT players. Presumably, most 
192 Financial Information, FY 2017 Form 990: Part III, U.S. SOCCER (emphasis 
added), https://www.ussoccer.com/governance/financial-information [https://perma.cc/ 
S4RP-GX8T].  
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observers would regard these results as “fair” though not “equal.” 
Of course, any pay arrangement must also recognize the different 
situations for WNT players and MNT players with respect to the 
stability and profitability of men’s and women’s professional soccer 
leagues. The MNT players are far less dependent on payments from the 
Federation because of the high professional team salaries that they 
receive.  
With these complications in mind, setting forth some guiding 
principles may assist in moving the parties toward an acceptable 
agreement, even if these principles leave some important details for 
future consideration. Three principles in particular should guide the 
parties. First, NWSL salaries should be considered as distinct from 
payments for national team service. Second, lump sum payments to the 
players’ associations should be paid in lieu of game bonuses. Third, 
prize money should continue to be paid to the team earning the prize. 
A. NWSL Salaries Should Be Separate from Payments for National
Team Service 
One of the complicating factors in comparing MNT players’ salaries 
and WNT players’ salaries is the fact that the Federation pays the 
professional team salaries for a number of WNT players. Although this 
is unquestionably a benefit to the players (and to the NWSL), these 
payments should not be “counted” in assessing the equality of 
compensation between MNT players and WNT players. The simple 
reason for this position is that WNT players perform additional services 
for these payments. They play at least twenty-four professional team 
games a year for their NWSL salaries.  
And why should the Federation continue to make these payments if 
they do not relate directly to national team service? Because the 
payments ensure that there is a stable and competitive women’s 
professional league in the United States, which provides regular 
training for current WNT players and serves as a developmental system 
for future WNT players. In effect, the payments made by the Federation 
for NWSL salaries are an investment in the future success of the WNT 
and, ultimately, of the Federation itself.  
B. Eliminate Game Bonus Payments and Make Equal Lump-Sum
Payments to the Players Associations 
One of the areas of greatest disparity in payments between the teams 
is the unequal game bonuses. Under their current CBAs, an MNT 
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player receives an average of $13,166 for a win in an international 
friendly;193 a WNT player receives only $6,750.194 Moreover, MNT 
players receive game bonuses for losses while WNT players do not. 
Similar disparities exist in the bonus payments for tournament 
qualifying games.  
The Federation has justified the lower game bonus payments it 
makes to the WNT players by citing the Annual Base Compensation 
that it pays to them but not to the MNT players. But the inconsistent 
compensation structures (pay-for-play with higher game bonuses for 
the MNT; base salary and lower game bonuses for the WNT) has 
created inequity. One way to address this would be simply to pay equal 
lump sums to each team’s players association and to eliminate game 
bonuses altogether. One has to ask whether game bonuses, particularly 
for friendlies, serve any effective purpose. Do players work harder and 
perform better because of individual game bonuses? Most likely, they 
do not. Players are motivated by the fact that they are representing their 
country, especially MNT players who risk losing significantly higher 
salaries playing for their professional teams if they are injured playing 
for the national team. Players are also motivated by the fact that they 
are trying to make the roster for the national team or trying to qualify 
the team for a particular tournament (which will involve tournament 
bonuses).  
Because the WNT players do not enjoy the same high amount of 
professional salaries as the MNT players, they continue to need the 
stability of a base salary from the Federation. If the Federation 
eliminated game bonuses and paid equal lump sums to each players 
association, this payment structure would accomplish the goal of equal 
treatment between the two teams and still provide the predictable 
payment stream that the women players need. The Norwegian Football 
Association announced such an arrangement in October 2017,195 so a 
model exists for how the Federation might work with the players 
associations to equalize base payments to both teams. As for health 
insurance and other employee benefits, the Federation could continue 
193 The MNT CBA provides for different payment amounts based on the ranking of the 
opponent. The $13,166 figure is an average of those payment amounts (($17,625 + $12,500 
+ $9,735) / 3).
194 This figure is calculated in the same way as the average for a MNT friendly win
(($8,500 + $6,500 + $5,250) / 3). 
195 Grant Wahl, What FIFA and the Rest of the World Can Learn from Norway’s 
Equitable Pay Agreement, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.si.com/ 
soccer/2017/10/08/fifa-women-soccer-equal-pay-norway-gianni-infantino 
[https://perma.cc/D2P8-F4XU].  
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to provide these for the WNT in connection with their NWSL service, 
thereby avoiding the cost of extending health insurance to MNT 
players, who are most likely already covered by their professional 
teams.  
C. Continue to Pass FIFA Prize Money Payments Through to the
Team That Earns the Prize Money 
The greatest disparity in potential payments under the two teams’ 
CBAs is in tournament bonuses. This relates to the huge discrepancy 
in prize money awarded by FIFA. As mentioned previously, FIFA 
awarded $400 million in prize money to participants in the 2018 Men’s 
World Cup, compared to only $30 million to participants in the 2019 
Women’s World Cup.196  
This substantial difference in prize money payments creates a 
perception of inequality. The difference in FIFA’s revenue from the 
men’s and women’s World Cup tournaments is driven largely by the 
discriminatory viewing habits of soccer spectators worldwide. 
Although that issue is beyond the control of the U.S. Soccer Federation, 
the Federation should still seek to address the disparity in prize 
payments. With respect to the CBAs, the Federation should treat the 
two teams equally by allowing each of them to receive a set, equal 
percentage of any tournament bonuses that the team earns.197 For 
example, each team could receive 50% of any FIFA prize money 
earned by the team’s performance. The Federation should also use its 
influence within FIFA to lobby for closing the growing gap in prize 
money payments.  
Prize money payments for the Women’s World Cup have increased 
substantially over time, but the absolute difference between men’s and 
women’s prize money continues to expand, as shown in Table 7.  
196 See FIFA FINANCIAL REPORT 2018, supra note 56, at 37. 
197 Again, this is the approach taken by the Norwegian Football Association. See Wahl, 
supra note 195. 
474 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98, 427 
Table 7. World Cup Prize Money Payments 









1990 / 1991 $0 $54 million $54 million 
1994 / 1995 $0 $71 million $71 million 
1998 / 1999 $0 $103 million $103 million 
2002 / 2003 $0 $156 million $156 million 
2006 / 2007 $5.8 million $270 million $264.2 million 
2010 / 2011 $5.8 million $348 million $342.2 million 
2014 / 2015 $15 million $358 million $343 million 
2018 / 2019 $30 million $400 million $370 million 
The prize money for the 2022 Men’s World Cup is budgeted to be 
$440 million.199 Following the success of the 2019 Women’s World 
Cup, FIFA President Gianni Infantino proposed expanding the field 
from twenty-four to thirty-two teams and doubling the prize money.200 
FIFA subsequently approved the increase in the number of Women’s 
World Cup participants.201 It has not yet officially acted on the 
proposed prize money increase. The Federation should use its influence 
to support a significant increase in the prize money for the women’s 
tournament so that FIFA can fulfill its stated objective of “promot[ing] 
198 FIFA WORLD CUP RUSSIA 2018, OFF THE PITCH: STATISTICAL KIT 4, 6–8 (2018), 
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/2018-fifa-world-cup-russiatm-off-the-pitch-
statistical-kit.pdf?cloudid=fuhiptanmaze9kiyqvvr [https://perma.cc/L9TP-HAX9]; Drew 
Nantais, Women’s World Cup Prize Money: How Much Will the Winners Make in 2019? 
Purse, Payouts for Entire Field, SPORTINGNEWS (June 28, 2019), https://www. 
sportingnews.com/us/soccer/news/womens-world-cup-prize-money-how-much-winners-
make-2019-purse-payouts/175riw9k9v9z51j12um36jh4yf [https://perma.cc/LU3K-PHGP]. 
199 See FIFA FINANCIAL REPORT 2018, supra note 56, at 35. 
200 Victor Mather, FIFA President Proposes Expansion of Women’s World Cup and 
Doubling of Prize Money, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
07/05/sports/fifa-world-cup-expansion.html [https://perma.cc/FHT6-257P]. 
201 See FIFA Council Unanimously Approves Expanded 32-Team Field for FIFA 
Women’s World Cup, FIFA (July 31, 2019), https://www.fifa.com/womensworldcup/news/ 
fifa-council-unanimously-approves-the-expansion-of-the-fifa-women-s-world-cup-to 
[https://perma.cc/MR73-59SK]. 
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the development of women’s football and the full participation of 
women at all levels of football governance.”202  
These principles still leave important issues for negotiation between 
the Federation and the players. But based on the EPA analysis above, 
it is clear that not every aspect of the WNT CBA and the MNT CBA 
needs to be the same to satisfy legal requirements, and there are reasons 
“other than sex” that might justify differences between the two 
agreements. The major financial terms of the agreements should follow 
the principles set forth above, however, to further the Federation’s 
mission to bring about greater gender equity.  
CONCLUSION 
The United States Women’s National Team has dominated women’s 
soccer since the first Women’s World Cup in 1991. Over the last 
twenty-eight years, the team has served as an inspiration for soccer 
players of both sexes, showing that the United States can succeed at the 
highest levels of the sport. It has been particularly impactful, though, 
for women and girls, who have drawn inspiration from the 
determination and strength of WNT players. The team has accelerated 
the development of women’s soccer through its success on the field and 
its leadership off it. That leadership has resulted in occasional conflict 
with the Federation, which historically failed to grant WNT players the 
compensation and respect they deserved.  
The current dispute between the WNT players and the Federation 
presents an opportunity. It is an opportunity for the Federation to take 
a major step toward realizing an important part of its mission: 
promoting gender equality. The WNT players have asserted a claim of 
discriminatory pay. The legal analysis of this claim favors the 
Federation, but that provides an even greater opportunity for the 
Federation to show its support for gender equality by granting more 
equitable terms to the WNT—not because it is legally required to do so 
but because it is the right thing to do. By using its resources and its 
influence to better compensate the WNT players and advance the sport 
of women’s soccer, the Federation might resolve the current dispute 
and also serve as a leader on the broader issue of gender equity.  
202 See FIFA STATUTES § 2(f) (2019), https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-
statutes-5-august-2019-en.pdf?cloudid=ggyamhxxv8jrdfbekrrm [https://perma.cc/L73P-5582].  
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